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 1 
Introduction 
 
Figure 1. “National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Freedom Rally in 
Indianapolis,” 1963-08-10, Indianapolis Recorder, Indiana Historical Society, P303_Box 96_Folder 
15_Unnumbered 002. 
 
 This photograph of a 1963 NAACP rally in Indianapolis, Indiana, vividly 
demonstrates the importance of not only the First Amendment, but also of 
infrastructure. Look closely. The four spectators at the bottom of this picture are 
using curbs in a way that municipal sanitation engineers of the 1890s probably never 
envisioned: as a means of organizing urban space to make themselves feel safe and 
protected—not just from the street and its hazards, but from their fellow human 
beings. Why did these men feel so uncomfortable that they put a whole street between 
themselves and the demonstrators? What is the street doing here? Originally designed 
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to separate humans from nature and unhealthy natural processes (such as effluents, 
rotting garbage, and mud), curbs are capable of quickly morphing into agents of 
separation between humans themselves.  
 Like sewerage and paved streets, curbs are an aspect of the ordinary, built 
environment that everyone takes for granted. Historians have traced the development 
of urban and suburban infrastructure in terms of both technological innovations and 
the various meanings of those improvements.1 Other writers have emphasized how 
the design and regulation of the built environment affects human interaction in, and 
use of, public spaces.2 Yet, no one has specifically examined the infrastructure in the 
                                                
1 See, for example, David J. Bodenhamer and Robert Barrows, eds., The Encyclopedia of Indianapolis 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Dolores Hayden, Building Suburbia: Green Fields and 
Urban Growth, 1820-2000, Vintage Books ed. (New York: Random House, 2004); I.B. Holley, Jr., 
“Blacktop: How Asphalt Paving Came to the Urban United States,” Technology and Culture 44, no. 4 
(2003): 703-733; Reprint ed., (Lanham, MD: National Asphalt Pavement Association, January, 2005); 
Suellen Hoy, Chasing Dirt: The American Pursuit of Cleanliness (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1995; Oxford paperback ed., 1996); Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of 
the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Lawrence H. Larsen, “Nineteenth-
Century Street Sanitation: A Study of Filth and Frustration,” Wisconsin Magazine of History 52, no. 3 
(Spring 1969): 239-247; Blake McKelvey, The Urbanization of America, 1860-1915 (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1963); Clay McShane, “Transforming the Use of Urban Space: A Look 
at the Revolution in Street Pavements, 1880-1924,” Journal of Urban History 5, no. 3 (May 1979): 
279-307; and all of Martin V. Melosi’s work, including: Martin V. Melosi, “Battling Pollution in the 
Progressive Era,” Landscape 26, no. 3 (1982): 35-41; Melosi, Effluent America: Cities, Industry, 
Energy, and the Environment (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001); Melosi, Garbage in 
the Cities: Refuse, Reform, and the Environment, rev. ed. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2005); and, Melosi, The Sanitary City: Urban Infrastructure in America from Colonial Times to the 
Present (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000). Also see the writings by the prolific Joel 
A. Tarr, including: Joel A. Tarr et al., “The Development and Impact of Urban Wastewater 
Technology: Changing Concepts of Water Quality,” in Pollution and Reform in American Cities 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980): 59-82; Tarr, “The Metabolism of the Industrial City: The 
Case of Pittsburgh,” Journal of Urban History 28, no. 5 (July 2002): 511-545; Tarr, “The Separate vs. 
Combined Sewer Problem: A Case Study in Urban Technology Design Choice,” Journal of Urban 
History 5, no. 3 (May 1979): 308-339; and Tarr et al., “Water and Wastes: A Retrospective 
Assessment of Wastewater Technology in the United States, 1800-1932,” Technology and Culture 25, 
no. 2 (April 1984): 226-263. 
2 These authors include: Christopher Alexander et al., A Pattern Language: Towns, Buildings, 
Construction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977); Mona Domosh and Joni Seager, “On the 
Move,” in Putting Women in Place: Feminist Geographers Make Sense of the World (New York: 
Guilford Press, 2001): 110-139; James S. Duncan and Nancy G. Duncan, Landscapes of Privilege: The 
Politics of the Aesthetic in an American Suburb (New York: Routledge, 2004); Margaret E. Farrar, 
“Health and Beauty in the Body Politic: Subjectivity and Urban Space,” Polity 33, no. 1 (Autumn 
2000): 1-23; Kevin Fitzpatrick and Mark La Gory, Unhealthy Places: The Ecology of Risk in the 
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city of Indianapolis in a way that synthesizes these elements and provides a historical 
context for the inequalities existing in contemporary times. It is not possible to comb 
through archives, read reports and minutes, or scan old maps and pinpoint a specific 
meeting during which an engineer or planner made the key decision that cemented a 
division between healthy and unhealthy neighborhoods, or to identify one single 
ordinance that shifted the power in the street from people to cars. Nevertheless, 
between 1890 and 1930 people in charge made certain decisions in Indianapolis 
regarding infrastructure—the character and condition of streets and sidewalks, the 
provision of sewer services and garbage collection, the location of the city’s dump 
(now a landfill), and the placement of the city’s sewage treatment plant—that resulted 
in long-term health and safety consequences. In Indianapolis, as in most modern 
American cities, some neighborhoods are less healthy for their inhabitants than 
others. The least healthy neighborhoods—those with the highest rates of cancer, for 
example—are situated on the city’s southwest side. The southwest side of 
Indianapolis is also the location of the landfill, the sewage treatment plant, and much 
heavy industry. The entire city is at the mercy of an ill-designed sewer system, a 
system that taxpayers are spending millions annually to repair. The years from 1890 
to 1930 saw the genesis of this state of affairs.  
This historical period was a tipping point for many American cities vis-à-vis 
infrastructure. But it is too simplistic to apply generalizations of mere periodicity to 
the mosaic of processes, people, factors, and decisions that characterize Progressive 
Era urban growth. Rather, historians must treat each city individually:  
                                                
Urban Landscape (New York: Routledge, 2000); and Margaret Kohn, Brave New Neighborhoods: The 
Privatization of Public Space (New York: Routledge, 2004). 
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a rigid technological determinism distorts the pattern of the  
evolution of the urban infrastructure. Although economic  
forces were obviously of great importance, the preferences  
and perceptions of different actors such as business leaders,  
politicians, and engineering professionals in a particular city  
at a particular time may be more important in the city building 
process than a generalized set of forces that relates to all cities.3  
 
In Indianapolis, both geography and powerful professional stakeholders contributed 
to the decision-making process: city planners, landscape architects, influential 
business owners, mayors, state legislators, city councilors, drivers of automobiles, 
and civil engineers. Many other stakeholders’ voices were silent or discounted, 
however, including those of pedestrians, working class laborers, and individual 
homeowners.  
 Tracing the history of the street in Indianapolis between 1890 and 1930 
reveals that, regardless of whether one considers what happened above the street or 
below it, issues of both power and identity are manifest in any discussion of the city’s 
built environment. 4 Power enters into the picture in two ways: first, people in 
positions of power made decisions regarding the street that would affect the entire 
population of Indianapolis for over a century; additionally, the non-elite public 
attributed new significance, meaning, and power to the street. This notion that a built 
environment can reflect the balance of power within a city gained legitimacy among 
scholars in the late twentieth century.5 Issues of identity present themselves when one 
                                                
3 Joel A. Tarr, “Building the Urban Infrastructure in the Nineteenth Century: An Introduction,” in 
Infrastructure and Urban Growth in the Nineteenth Century, No. 14 in the Essays in Public Works 
History Series, ed. by Howard Rosen. Chicago: Public Works Historical Society (Dec. 1985), 61-62. 
4 For purposes of this paper, “the street” includes the sidewalk, the curb, and the physical street, as well 
as articles people put in or near the street such as garbage, and what is under the street, especially the 
sewers. 
5 See, for example, Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan 
Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995) and Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in 
Los Angeles (London: Verso, 2006). 
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considers the street as a borderland, a place where a “seething exchange” occurs 
among and between individuals using the same space.6  
 The poet and writer Gloria Anzaldúa first articulated the concept of 
borderlands in her work Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza in 1987. 
Anzaldúa characterized the borderlands as being “physically present whenever two or 
more cultures edge each other, where people of different races occupy the same 
territory, where under, lower, middle and upper classes touch, where the space 
between two individuals shrinks with intimacy.”7 While historians like Thomas 
Sizgorich and Jeffrey Jerome Cohen have used the construct of borderlands in 
discussions of cultural identity and cultural hybridity, one can rightly apply the 
concept of borderlands to discussions of the spatial hybridity that occurs in zones like 
sidewalks and streets where people from all constituencies interact.8 In these places 
within a city, people are largely anonymous; they can take on any identity they wish 
to assume. We do not know most of the people we encounter on the street, and they 
do not know us. Yet we all work from the same narrative of power and order—we 
know that we must adhere to the rules and stay out of the street for our own safety 
because pedestrians are powerless, defenseless, in the street. Even on the sidewalk, 
those who are able-bodied enjoy more access and mobility than those who are 
hampered in some way. The borderlands are uncomfortable because they can be 
                                                
6 Thomas Sizgorich, “Narrative and Community in Islamic Late Antiquity,” Past & Present 185 (Nov. 
2004): 9-42, at 16. 
7 Gloria Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza, 3rd ed. (San Francisco: Aunt Lute 
Books, 2007), 19. 
8 Cohen writes: “The endlessly conjunctive work of monstrous hybridity produces an unbounded 
middle space, as unstable corporally as it is geographically and temporally. This middle, this bridge 
conjoining differences, is the borderlands.” Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, “Hybrids, Monsters, Borderlands: 
The Bodies of Gerald of Wales,” in The Postcolonial Middle Ages, ed. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, The 
New Middle Ages Series, Bonnie Wheeler, Series ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 96. 
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unpredictable places, venues where cultures clash and sexes mix, just as streets can 
become disorderly when tacit rules give way to mob rule. When boundaries shift, 
when people are no longer sure what is public and what is private, or what is healthy 
and what is unhealthy, change occurs. The years between 1890 and 1930 saw a 
seismic shifting of these categories with respect to the street, and recent history has 
proved that the convulsions are not ending. 
 Since the nineteenth century, curbs and paved streets have signified control on 
at least two levels. They separate people from nature in the interest of public health, 
and they divide people symbolically and physically by delineating different categories 
of access. First, curbs help humans control their physical environment. Curbs separate 
and channel that which is unhealthy and associated with the street (wastewater, 
garbage, fast-moving traffic) from sidewalks and other spaces where people live and 
work. So, curbs (along with street gutters, sewers, and pavement) regulate humans’ 
interaction with the natural world.  
Second, curbs function as both intentional and unintentional controllers of 
access. They regulate humans’ interaction with the built environment by determining 
accessibility. Anyone who has ever faced a curb while navigating something with 
wheels knows how effectively curbs regulate access. In urban environments, curbs 
are physical barriers to access in a very real way for people with disabilities, for 
people whose work requires them to manipulate carts, and for people who are 
caregivers of children and the disabled. In some suburbs, such as those designed for 
families with children, the shape and grade of curbs can facilitate access and 
recreation, thus encouraging free travel across property boundaries. Since humans 
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decide on the placement and design of curbs, the granite or concrete mini-walls also 
represent humans’ interactions with each other—the power to control access itself. In 
this respect, curbs often delineate the boundaries between public space and private 
space. Curbs are also markers of legitimate space (something whose definition 
changes depending on the circumstances)—especially in the context of crowd control 
and law enforcement. In this context as well, curbs define humans’ interactions with 
each other. People use a curb as a line of demarcation, as the men in Figure 1 are 
doing. In what is unquestionably public space, curbs become agents of public safety 
when they facilitate crowd control.  
 Before the widespread paving of American streets, curbs simply functioned to 
separate the sidewalk (if one existed) from the street. Although the street was dirty, it 
was also a social gathering spot for many, especially in urban areas. Children played 
in the streets in the decades before the Progressive Era’s playground movement, and 
people of all ages visited with each other and transacted business during street fairs. 
Sidewalks, curbs, and streets were all patently public spaces. However, once paved 
streets began to enable high volumes and swift movement of motorized traffic, the 
street lost its character as a locus of socialization. The urgencies of commerce 
relegated humans into the pedestrian realm, out of the street. The meaning of “public 
space” began to change, and the amount of space allocated to the public shrank. The 
past 120 years since the paving revolution have witnessed an evolution of “quasi-
public space”—places that are no longer clearly public—and the establishment of 
private or restricted space in what had heretofore been solidly public areas. During 
this time, curbs, pavement, sewerage, and sidewalks served as more than just essential 
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components of infrastructure. They defined and shaped the changing spaces around 
the street, and in the process they defined and shaped humans’ interactions with the 
natural world and with each other. Streets evolved from shared spaces to areas 
reserved for transportation that allowed the presence of pedestrians only on an 
intermittent, predictable basis. Sidewalks transitioned from venues that were open to 
everyone to places with restrictions on appearance and behavior. The street and its 
appurtenances are a functional, quotidian part of the human environment, but history 
demonstrates that their meanings and influence are at once logical and unpredictable, 
perverse and profound.  
 9 
Part One: On the Street 
 During the years between 1890 and 1930, the culture of the street changed—
people on foot lost space, and the culture of the car became dominant. Historians have 
observed that this shift in power went hand in hand with the rise of professional city 
planning.9 The city of Indianapolis followed these national trends. Specifically, city 
officials paved streets to facilitate commerce. They enacted ordinances regulating 
behavior on the sidewalks and on the street. They formalized systems for collecting 
garbage, and they addressed other public health issues. And, through the use of 
zoning, city officials tried to designate special uses for certain areas of the city. These 
developments would play a critical role in the establishment of a new order on the 
street, a regime that prioritized traffic over social contact and elevated conformity 
over individual expression. 
 
 
 
                                                
9 Peter C. Baldwin, Domesticating the Street: The Reform of Public Space in Hartford, 1850-1930 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1999), especially Chapter 8, 201-229. See also John D. 
Fairfield, “The Scientific Management of Urban Space: Professional City Planning and the Legacy of 
Progressive Reform,” Journal of Urban History 20, no. 2 (Feb. 1994): 179-204, and Clay McShane, 
“Transforming the Use of Urban Space: A Look at the Revolution in Street Pavements, 1880-1924,” 
Journal of Urban History 5, no. 3 (May 1979): 279-307. 
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Chapter One: Pavement, Curbs, and Sidewalks 
The steady urbanization occurring in U.S. cities during the nineteenth century 
meant the demise of the “walking city,” one “compact enough that an individual 
could easily walk from one end to the other.”10 As cities increased in scale and 
industrialization, so did their populations and modes of transportation—and so did the 
problem of dirty, unhealthy streets. In many cities, pedestrians contended with 
unpaved streets that grew extremely muddy when it rained, as well as streets that 
teemed with everyday hazards like household garbage, waste from chamber pots, and 
the byproducts of horses used for transportation.11 So even after the Civil War, as 
public health advocates gained prominence, denizens of cities still had to contend 
with mostly dirty, unpaved streets that resisted attempts to clean them.12 Indianapolis 
was comparable to other cities with respect to the condition of its streets. Writing in 
1910, historian Jacob Piatt Dunn observed that it was “difficult even for those who 
lived here at the time to realize now the wretched condition of the streets up to 1891. 
As a general rule the business streets were paved with ‘bowlders’ or cobble-stones, 
presenting an uneven surface over which vehicles rattled and jolted, with interstices 
in which rain and sprinkling water stood until splashed out by wheels. The only 
improvement of other streets was grading and graveling. In wet weather they were 
                                                
10 Zane L. Miller, The Urbanization of Modern America: A Brief History (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1973), 3. 
11 Lawrence H. Larsen, “Nineteenth-Century Street Sanitation: A Study of Filth and Frustration,” 
Wisconsin Magazine of History 52, no. 3 (Spring 1969): 240-241. According to Larsen, “ . . . horse 
manure and urine created an almost unsolvable situation.” Ibid., 239. “A single horse discharged 
gallons of urine and nearly twenty pounds of fecal matter into the streets daily, which not only posed a 
health hazard but also degraded streetcar rails . . . The environmental problems posed by horsecars 
were considerable and widespread, since more than 100,000 horses and mules were pulling 18,000 
horsecars on 3,500 miles of track throughout the nation by the mid-1880s.” Martin V. Melosi, Effluent 
America: Cities, Industry, Energy, and the Environment (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2001), 35.  
12 Larsen, 245. According to Larsen, the usual methods of cleaning dirt roads included sprinkling them 
with water in an effort to reduce dust and spreading gravel on them.   
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muddy . . .  ”13 In 1892, Mayor Thomas L. Sullivan observed that “[t]o keep the 
streets of Indianapolis clean is a Herculean task.”14 In 1899, Adolph Schmuck, a staff 
member for the Indianapolis News, visited Paris and wrote home to a friend 
comparing the two cities’ thoroughfares: 
I don’t know how it is in the rest of Europe, but as for Paris,  
I find, after riding about on a bicycle, that the streets are little 
better, if any, than those of Indianapolis . . . They have many 
of the same troubles here that we have with our streets at home. 
Most of the last month has been without rain, and a fine and  
very annoying dust was blown in clouds on every windy day.  
Where the streets are sprinkled they were, as at home, made  
sloppy and treacherous for either bicycle tires or horses’ hoofs. 
It is, in fact, a regular thing for horses to slip on pavements here.15 
 
A paved street was, in theory, easier to keep clean; yet as of 1880, less than half of 
the nation’s city streets were paved.16  In 1890, Indianapolis had a total of 400 miles 
of streets and alleys; 234 miles, or 58.5 percent of the surfaces, were paved.17 When 
cities paved their more heavily used streets, they frequently used cobblestones (see 
Figure 2, below, for a contemporary example of a street with a cobblestone 
pavement).  
 
                                                
13 Jacob Piatt Dunn, Greater Indianapolis: The History, the Industries, the Institutions, and the People 
of a City of Homes, Vol. I (Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Company, 1910; reprint ed. Evansville, IN: 
Unigraphic, Inc., 1977), 309. 
14 Journals of the Common Council, Board of Aldermen, and Joint Conventions of Said Bodies For the 
Years 1892 and 1893 (Indianapolis: Sentinel Printing Co., 1895),15. 
15 “The Pavements in Paris,” Indianapolis News, 11 July 1899, p. 7, c. 5. 
16 McShane, 279. 
17 Martin V. Melosi, Garbage in the Cities: Refuse, Reform, and the Environment, rev. ed. (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 36. 
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Figure 2. Cobblestone surface in the 500 block of Lockerbie Street, Indianapolis, Indiana, February, 
2006. Photograph by author.  
 
 Recognizing the commercial, practical, and sanitary need for a comprehensive 
plan for paving the city’s streets, the Commercial Club of Indianapolis (the 
forerunner of the Chamber of Commerce) sponsored a street paving exposition in 
Indianapolis in 1890. Representatives from paving companies and businesses 
associated with street paving came from all over the country to the event. A visitor to 
the exhibits would have encountered samples of every paving medium and ancillary 
material available in that day.18 The Commercial Club issued an extremely 
comprehensive report detailing the mechanical specifications of each paving material 
                                                
18 The paving media and ancillary materials included: granite; bituminous rock (sandstone coated with 
a film of natural bitumen); fire clay from Brazil, Indiana; fire bricks; oolite stone from the Romona 
quarries some forty-eight miles from Indianapolis; Jasperite; asphalts from the island of Trinidad, 
which had an asphalt lake; vulcanite; Medina Stone; red cedar blocks; and various other kinds of 
bricks, macadam, cement, and even sand for mortar. 
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in every exhibit, each material’s manufacturing process, and the provenance of each 
paving medium. The publication compared the costs of stone, asphalt, brick, and 
wood surfaces (to other selected cities) and contained the text of reports issued by 
delegations from other cities. The city’s business leaders concluded that asphalt and 
brick were the most attractive options for paving the majority of Indianapolis, but that 
stone was the best option for heavy-traffic areas.19 Finally, the business leaders 
offered some prescient and thoughtful “Suggestions”:  
[w]e believe that a uniform system should be adopted for 
 the improvement of the streets of Indianapolis. In carrying 
 out such a system, we believe that an effort should be made 
 to have sewer, gas and water pipes laid, and necessary  
 connections made to the curb line, before concrete foundations 
 are put down on the streets. We believe that a uniform style 
 and quality of curbing should be used, and that there should 
 be a uniform method of setting and trimming shade trees along  
 the streets.20 
 
As sensible as these suggestions seem, paving urban streets would prove to be 
controversial. Within just four years, Indianapolis’s Common Council was regularly 
considering ordinances concerning street improvements, including paving streets. A 
citizens’ group appeared at the council meeting on Monday evening, 7 May 1894, to 
protest an ordinance that would have paved New Jersey Street with asphalt—an 
improvement its neighbor one block to the west, Alabama Street, had recently 
                                                
19 “…We believe that the various methods of paving—stone, asphalt, brick, wood and macadam—have 
special merits for particular streets on which the traffic is suited to their uses, but that on the leading 
business and residence streets the pavements that will probably be found the most satisfactory, in view 
of experience in other cities, are asphalt and brick of the most durable qualities, and that where put 
down, a guarantee for not less than ten years should be required. For heavy traffic stone is 
unquestionably superior to all other kinds of material.” The Commercial Club, Charles E. Kregelo, 
Chairman, Street Paving Exposition, et al., Report of the Street Paving Exposition (Indianapolis: The 
Commercial Club of Indianapolis, 1890), 22. 
20 Ibid. 
 14 
undergone.21 The group’s circular expressed their vehement opposition to the “asphalt 
ordinance” because “asphalt is a foreign commodity; [it] is controlled by a monopoly 
. . . is not honestly and properly put down . . . is dusty . . . hot . . . does not wear well . 
. . does not admit of free competition among contractors . . . is expensive to put down 
. . . to keep clean . . . to repair . . . is a failure.”22 The anti-asphalt lobbyists also 
argued that they had already paid for two sewers in the past year, and anticipated 
having to help pay for others. They noted that their street was not in bad shape to 
begin with; in fact, it was in “fair condition, and all it needs is cleaning.”23 The 
protesters believed the improved street would be too wide and that the entire project 
was superfluous and too expensive. They had recently paid for a “new stone curb and 
bowldered gutter, nine feet wide on each side” that “are in good and sound condition 
and will last for many years. It is extravagant waste to destroy these and make us pay 
for new material for the same purpose.”24 A spokesman for the aggrieved citizens 
responded to a question from one of the councilmen about what type of improvement, 
if any, he would favor by voicing a preference for no improvement at all, and then 
suggesting cedar blocks or brick as a fall-back position. After some discussion, the 
council approved the ordinance to pave with asphalt by a 15-5 vote. 
While this episode may seem to merely highlight the eccentric prejudices of a 
few taxpayers who felt put-upon during the depression that began in 1893, the event 
illustrates a national trend. From approximately 1890 to 1900, bicyclists, public 
                                                
21 The group against the improvement distributed a circular to each councilman signed, “Committee 
New Jersey-Street Resident Property-Owners.” “Sustained by the Council,” Indianapolis News, 8 May 
1894. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. A “boulder” or “bowlder” is “[a]ny detached and rounded or worn mass of rock, larger than a 
cobblestone.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1953), 
99. 
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health advocates, teamsters, and civil engineers led a sizeable campaign to pave 
America’s city streets in asphalt.25 Among these pro-asphalt groups, the bicyclists’ 
position was probably the most predictable, since their sport required a smooth 
surface for its execution. The public health advocates’ support of asphalt was 
attributable to the fact that it was easy to clean, and the omnipresence of horse 
manure made such a quality essential in any widely used paving medium. The 
teamsters’ argument was commercial: as “increased trade led urban traffic to grow 
three to six times more rapidly than burgeoning populations . . . trucking interests 
thus became much more potent lobbying groups.”26 Additionally, engineers had 
convinced the teamsters (who affirmed their support) that smooth pavements would 
not cause their horses to slip and fall any more often than granite blocks (granite had 
been asphalt’s chief rival for heavy-duty paving jobs). Engineers were also able to 
successfully convince municipal authorities that “well-paved streets would reduce the 
cost of freight haulage to the point that asphalt-using cities would attract new 
businesses, thereby increasing the tax base.” 27 Among all the different pro-asphalt 
constituencies, the engineers were the most influential. The engineers’ success in the 
asphalt pavement campaign epitomizes the Progressive Era’s growing reliance on 
experts to solve public problems. 
Whatever one thinks of the quality of their arguments against the “asphalt 
ordinance,” the New Jersey Street protesters were correct in at least two respects 
                                                
25 McShane, 291. 
26 Ibid., 295. 
27 Ibid., 294-295. 
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about the asphalt industry in the mid-1890s: it was a foreign commodity, and it was 
controlled by a monopoly. 28  
One corporation, the Barber Asphalt Company, held a  
monopoly on the excellent natural deposits in Trinidad.  
The municipal engineers . . . launched an attack on this  
‘asphalt trust,’ which was one of the targets of muckraking 
journalists. Through a variety of scientific tests, these  
engineers demonstrated that artificial asphalt made from 
oil from California’s newly discovered fields was equal 
or superior to the ‘trust’s’ product. Thus, their scientific 
research not only led to the ultimate domination of asphalt 
as a pavement surface, but also provided important political    
propaganda in support of engineering autonomy.29 
 
The engineers were on their way to becoming technocrats. They proved themselves to 
be both successful lobbyists and savvy scientists with a shrewd sense of politesse. 
Their opinions would come to dominate the fields of urban and suburban street 
design, and their decisions would dictate which streets were accessible to whom. 
The New Jersey Street protesters were also right about the increasing expense 
of street improvements. A typical street in the 1890s included a base or foundational 
layer, then the paving surface, as well as granite curbs and brick sidewalks, with 
water, gas, sewer, electric, and telephone lines running underneath the street 
surface.30 As expensive as the improvements were, in many cases they served to 
                                                
28 When Columbus landed at what is now called Trinidad, he found Trinidad Lake, a huge natural 
deposit of asphalt, and used it to caulk his ships after their Atlantic crossing. Asphalt’s first use on U.S. 
roads was not until 1856, when workers paved Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, D.C. with asphalt 
from Trinidad Lake mixed with aggregate. Paving the Way: Images from the History of Hot Mix 
Asphalt (National Asphalt Pavement Association, 2000), videocassette. Another huge deposit of 
natural asphalt is in Bermudez field, in Venezuela. “This deposit covered a thousand acres, but to a 
depth of only eight to ten feet. Venezuela lay only a hundred miles beyond Trinidad, and transportation 
costs to the United States were not significantly greater. By 1900 these two sources were supplying 
much of the asphalt used in the United States.” I.B. Holley, Jr., “Blacktop: How Asphalt Paving Came 
to the Urban United States,” Technology and Culture 44, no.4 (2003): 703-733; reprint ed. January 
2005, by the National Asphalt Pavement Association, Lanham, MD. 
29 McShane, 295. 
30 Sam Bass Warner, Jr., Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870-1900, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 138. 
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increase property values, especially when the improvements included a widening of 
the street, which reduced the amount of saleable land in play between the streets and 
made it more valuable.31  
 Despite the protests of property owners like the New Jersey Street citizens, the 
city of Indianapolis would follow the national trend in improving as many streets as 
fiscally possible. Jacob Piatt Dunn reported that in early 1891, the city’s legal 
boundaries encompassed 7.927 acres, or 12.39 square miles. Under an ordinance 
passed on 18 April 1891, the area grew to 9.6 acres, or 15.03 square miles.32 “At the 
beginning of 1891, the city had 1.632 miles of asphalt streets, 1.69 of vulcanite, 1.90 
of cedar block, [and] 2.22 of macadam. In 1891 [the city] constructed 4.118 [miles] of 
asphalt and 1.90 of brick; and in 1892 [it paved] 2.96 [more] miles of asphalt and 
3.94 miles of brick[,] . . . [plus] .99 mile of brick alleys. There were a little over 10 
miles of graveled and bowldered streets completed in the two years, and 15 miles of 
brick and cement sidewalks.”33 During the tenure of Mayor Thomas L. Sullivan, 
according to Dunn, the city began taking responsibility for sweeping the paved 
streets. Property owners paid for a system of street sprinkling, “street name signs 
were put up, [and] the streets renumbered . . . ”34 The development of the streets 
continued, as the city government directed more resources to their improvement. In 
1894, the city laid 3.99 miles of asphalt streets, 4 miles of brick streets, 1.07 miles of 
wooden block streets, and 9.65 miles of cement sidewalks, while in 1895 the city 
                                                
31 See, e.g., Jason Gilliland’s case study of three streets in Montreal from 1862 to 1900. Jason 
Gilliland, “The Creative Destruction of Montreal: Street Widenings and Urban (Re)Development in 
the Nineteenth Century,” Urban History Review 31, no. 1 (Fall 2002): 37-51. 
32 Dunn, 416. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 419. 
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constructed 8.36 miles of asphalt streets, 1.77 miles of brick streets, 1.60 miles of 
wooden block streets, and 11.77 miles of sidewalks.35  
Under the administration of Mayor Thomas Taggart from 1896 to 1901, the 
city’s asphalt streets increased from 26.88 to 43.09 miles; brick streets grew from 
15.76 to 25.75 miles; wooden block streets also grew from 1.60 to 15.77 miles’ 
worth; and, cement walks grew from 34.91 miles to 154.99 miles.36 Dunn noted an 
innovation with respect to the wooden block streets that may have accounted for the 
dramatic increase in their use in such a short time, describing those blocks as having 
been “creosoted,” or “treated with oil of coal tar before laying, to prevent decay. This 
was a new process, introduced at this time.”37 In fact, Indianapolis was the first city to 
make use of creosoted wood blocks for street paving in the late 1890s. As of 1911, 
that paving method was second in popularity in American cities only to asphalt. One 
expert, George W. Tillson, a Consulting Engineer to the Borough of Brooklyn, New 
York City, explained that its popularity was mostly due to the fact that a “wood 
pavement is as nearly noiseless as it is probably possible to make any pavement. Its 
principal and almost its only objection is its slipperiness, and that occurs only when 
the pavement is wet or frosty.” 38 He further remarked that the “durability of 
creosoted yellow pine blocks has surprised municipal engineers, and these blocks 
have now been accepted as a durable paving material.”39  
                                                
35 Ibid., 421. 
36 Ibid., 422. 
37 Ibid. 
38 George W. Tillson, “The Street Surface,” Proceedings of the Third National Conference on City 
Planning, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 15-17, 1911 (Cambridge: University Press, 1911), 212. 
39 Ibid., 213. 
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From 1906 through 1917, the city added an average of nineteen miles of 
improved streets per year. In 1906, the city cleaned 111.81 miles of improved streets 
at a cost of $734.99 per mile; in 1910, it cleaned 180.59 miles at $599.95 per mile; in 
1915, 274.83 miles at $552.90 per mile, and in 1917, it cleaned 322.03 miles at 
$464.36 per mile. From 1914 through 1917, the city added 54.94 miles of asphalt 
roadway at a cost of $1,974,067.64. It added 11.05 miles of bituminous concrete 
roadway at a cost of $388,382.47, and 12.74 miles of brick roadway at a cost of 
$306,527.37. The city also added 0.25 mile of creosoted block roadway for 
$17,497.35, and 1.53 miles of reinforced concrete roadway for $33,403.88. During 
that same period, the city constructed 73.99 miles of sidewalks at a cost of 
$378,412.72, and 58.08 miles of gravel roadway for $403,667.63—all in just four 
years.40 These numbers demonstrate that, in the early years of the twentieth century, 
the mayors and other city leaders wanted this kind of rapid, expensive development 
very badly. Those in power had to find a way to pay for both the construction and the 
maintenance of the new streets. 
By and large, property owners financed these improvements at a rate 
determined by a growing bureaucracy. As early as 1912, the City of Indianapolis had 
so many regulations concerning the legal process of making these improvements that 
its Board of Public Works published a single-spaced, twenty-seven-page booklet 
covering condemnation, assessment, payment of damages, and remonstrance/appeal 
procedures. The Board of Public Works gave affected landowners notice and an 
opportunity to be heard and a right of remonstrance for objecting to improvements, 
                                                
40 Joseph E. Bell, Message of Honorable Joseph E. Bell, Mayor, to the Common Council Reviewing 
Work Accomplished During His Administration January, 1914 to January, 1918, Submitted to the 
Common Council of the City of Indianapolis, January 2, 1918 (23 pp.), 9-10. 
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and used a competitive bidding procedure.41 City officials and engineers knew they 
literally could not afford to discount the views of property owners such as the New 
Jersey Street protesters. Like their counterparts in the executive branch, members of 
the city’s Common Council also proved to be somewhat responsive at times to the 
wishes of the voters who were property owners. For example, in the late Summer and 
Fall of 1919, although the administration of Mayor Charles W. Jewett repeatedly 
recommended street improvements, the council’s Committee on City’s Welfare 
refused to pass ordinances authorizing funding and work for the upgrades. Some of 
the streets for which the committee did not pass improvements contained pavements 
that had been in use for over twenty years.42 
F.S. Besson, an expert with the Army Corps of Engineers, wrote in 1923 that 
the “problem of the Engineer of Highways in deciding when a street should be paved 
is made easier if the paving assessments on abutting property are on a proper basis. If 
assessments are too heavy, residents instead of desiring pavements clamor for an 
extravagant expenditure of non-assessable maintenance funds.”43 Besson further 
observed that if “the interest of the general public is large, for instance, a Traffic 
Highway which has a wide roadway in order to accommodate large volumes of 
traffic, and for which a high-priced pavement is necessary, about two-thirds of the 
cost should be paid from general taxes and one-third be charged against the abutting 
property.” “On the other hand,” he argued, “on a residential Local Street where the 
                                                
41 Christian A. Schrader, Charles L. Hutchinson, Edward J. O’Reilly, Board of Public Works, Laws 
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Improvements and Sewers, 1912. 
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pavement is largely for the benefit of those living along the street these proportions 
should be reversed with probably two-thirds of the cost charged against the 
property.”44 Besson believed that most residents living near the street wanted two 
features from their pavements and curbs: appearance and comfort.45 The residents of 
New Jersey Street in 1894 obviously already believed that their brick street possessed 
those two features. 
 The anti-asphalt contrarians also seemed to be complaining about their general 
loss of control over decisions which affected them directly, and in this respect they 
were not alone. As urban historian Clay McShane demonstrates in his seminal piece 
on street pavements, the wide acceptance and use of asphalt in the 1890s represented 
not only the genesis of a new attitude in American cities, but also a quantum leap in 
people’s relationships with the built environment. Now it became important to 
separate oneself from the street not only because it was dirty, but also (thanks to the 
paving revolution) because the street was now associated with transportation, not 
socializing. The street was no longer a relatively safe place to play or to visit with 
one’s neighbors. Thus, curbs began to separate people from each other. As McShane 
put it, “[f]ast-moving vehicles made streets, the only open spaces in most older 
neighborhoods, too dangerous for social gatherings or children’s games.”46 Like their 
counterparts in Indianapolis, a group of citizens in Brooklyn protested asphalt paving 
for their street. In their 1896 petition, the New York residents “complained that  
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. . . the resulting traffic would lead to noise (from pounding horseshoes) . . . [and] 
extra traffic [that would endanger their children].”47 McShane also notes that the 
Brooklyn residents never addressed the issue of cleanliness. It is possible, he reasons, 
that they understood that attracting more traffic would serve to increase pollution.  
McShane is not the only observer who perceived the encroachment of traffic 
into what had previously been shared territory on the street. City planning scholars 
have also remarked on the power shift. When officials designed streets, commercial 
interests (such as transportation) took precedence over residential concerns. As 
engineers concentrated on vehicular movement, speed, and efficiency, the streets 
became less accessible to the public. Vehicles grew dominant, and pedestrians grew 
powerless. 
[P]edestrians . . . have been significantly removed from streets 
and, thereby, from public space. In practice, this has meant that 
the power over street space has shifted from the people who live 
around a given street to the people who drive through it. The use 
value of the street for local people has been usurped for the use  
of outsiders who are just passing through.48 
 
Kenneth T. Jackson similarly identifies a definite shift in users’ beliefs about the 
purpose of streets between the mid-nineteenth century and 1920: “when row houses 
predominated, the street was the primary open space, and it performed an important 
recreational function. By 1920, however, most urban residents and virtually all 
highway engineers saw streets primarily as arteries for motor vehicles.”49 Likewise, 
Martin V. Melosi’s chapter on street cleaning in his Garbage in the Cities explores 
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similar themes, and Melosi points out that “[t]hese changes predated the widespread 
use of the automobile.” When Ford’s first Model T appeared in 1909, almost one-
third of U.S. city streets were clad in asphalt (the medium that Melosi states is most 
commonly associated with the rise of private motorized transportation). “The impact 
of the automobile on urban street construction and transportation patterns,” he argues, 
“was not significant until about 1914.”50 In other words, it was commerce that drove 
the paving revolution, not the internal combustion engine. 
 The advent of street paving transformed curbs from mere boundary markers to 
tangible social barriers. As early as the end of the nineteenth century in some cities, 
curbs not only separated people from traffic but also from each other. This 
segregation was no doubt an unforeseen consequence of a seemingly benign 
improvement to urban infrastructure. Historian Stanley K. Schultz described the way 
streets functioned before paving in his book, Constructing Urban Culture: American 
Cities and City Planning, 1800-1920, and the difference between how people used 
streets before and after the 1890s is stark.  
For much of the nineteenth century, urban Americans, like 
their counterparts in England and France, considered streets  
an extension of their own property . . . streets met social needs. 
They were gathering places for a variety of activities: shopping 
in open-air markets or at peddlers’ carts; promenading on a  
Sunday afternoon; dancing on festive occasions; drinking and 
playing cards with friends and neighbors; overseeing the games  
of children frolicking in the street as playground. Until about mid-
century, most private homes directly fronted streets, which 
introduced fresh air and light into the interior of houses; and 
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since few houses had entry halls, people leaving their homes 
stepped directly into the streets. Americans treated streets as 
if they were front yards, and most municipalities, which legally 
could have acted otherwise, acquiesced in this practice. 51 
 
 It is thus no wonder that widespread street paving served to divide people 
from each other. As the street evolved from a place for socialization to one for 
transportation, neighbors lost a gathering place. Once a street was improved, a visit 
with a friend across the street required a trip to the end of the block for the crosswalk 
instead of a casual, spontaneous meeting somewhere in the middle. In this way, the 
street began to organize people according to their roles: if a person was on horseback 
or in an automobile and needed to move quickly, an improved street served him very 
well. If, however, a person was on foot, she was assigned a limited amount of space 
on the edge. Infrastructure thus separated, and arguably gave priority to, people 
engaged in commerce from those engaged in other pursuits. Finally, technological 
advances divided city leaders and engineers from the public whenever conflicts arose 
about the decision to improve a street. In Indianapolis, it was not until 1919 that 
public pressure against these types of expenditures actually materialized in regular 
defeats for proposals to improve streets. Put another way, for almost the first thirty 
years of the paving revolution in Indianapolis, the interests of those who needed the 
street to make money outweighed the concerns of those who paid for the 
improvements.  
This tension between the public’s desires for modernity and the consequences 
of the fulfillment of that vision would manifest itself in the form of traffic problems, 
                                                
51 Stanley K. Schultz, Constructing Urban Culture: American Cities and City Planning, 1800-1920. 
Technology and Urban Growth Series, ed. by Blaine A. Brownell, Donald T. Critchlow, Mark S. 
Foster, Mark H. Rose, and Joel A. Tarr. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), 176-177. 
 25 
including loss of life, as we shall see in the next chapter. City residents did truly want 
cleaner, smoother streets, and it may have been difficult to predict both the isolation 
and the danger that would follow. A system of paved streets, curbs, and sidewalks 
resulted in a new environment on the street, one that required regulation. Just as 
municipal civil engineers built this infrastructure to improve the public sphere, traffic 
engineers also limited people’s access to both the sidewalk and the street in the 
interests of health and safety—but again, at a cost.  
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Chapter Two: Traffic 
 As historians like Clay McShane have observed, one of the surest ways to 
destroy a sense of community is to introduce high volumes of traffic, so that the street 
loses its character as a hub of socialization. The street becomes a literal no-man’s-
land, and the curb a boundary between that which is safe and that which is unsafe. 
[T]he heavier the traffic in an area, the less people think of it 
as home territory. Not only do residents view the streets with 
heavy traffic as less personal, but they feel the same about the 
houses along the street.52 
 
The social cost of cars includes isolation: cars separate driver from pedestrian and 
neighbor from neighbor.53 This problem affects both suburban and urban areas, but in 
different ways. According to Donald Appleyard, middle-class people view the street 
as a sanctuary, while working-class urban dwellers view the street as a social center.54 
Appleyard writes about how a neighborhood’s street layout could discourage traffic 
and provide shared space between pedestrians and cars by eliminating curbs that 
distinguish sidewalks from streets and thus “convey . . . the impression that the whole 
street is usable by pedestrians.”55 Of course, the safety and “livability” that 
                                                
52 Donald Appleyard and Mark Lintell, Environmental Quality of City Streets (Berkeley: Center for 
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pedestrians desire often conflict with drivers’ values of mobility and speed.56 Even 
healthy, swift adults have sometimes experienced the feeling of being prey as they 
cross a street crowded with cars and trucks piloted by impatient drivers. This tension 
between a poorly designed curb, sidewalk, and street affects no one more than a 
person with impaired mobility. 
 Mona Domosh and Joni Seager have written that people’s ability to move, or 
to “overcome the ‘friction of distance’” is obviously dependent on their physical 
condition, but, perhaps less obviously, is also a function of social status. They have 
noted that the “design of public spaces, facilities, and transportation clearly favors the 
most physically fit, nonchildbearing, nonchild-caretaking segment of the population.” 
57 Vernacular architecture, including a curb, sends a message from its designer that 
can either read, “Welcome,” or “You shouldn’t be here.” 
 Along the lines of Domosh and Seager’s “friction of distance,” Fitzpatrick and 
La Gory write of a theory called “environmental press,” which explains how barriers 
in the environment affect a person’s health. According to this theory, “person-
environment relations are a function of the environment’s capacity to challenge the 
individual (its ‘press’ level), as well as the individual’s ability to deal with those 
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challenges (‘competence’).”58 The more environmental press one experiences, the 
less healthy that person’s daily life. The built environment constantly challenges 
disabled people and others with mobility impairments.59 As for the elderly and 
disabled populations, since they cannot meet those challenges as well as the able-
bodied, obstacles like curbs effectively reduce their health even more.60 
 Accessibility has been on the federal government’s radar screen since the mid-
1960s. In September of 1965 Congress created the National Commission on 
Architectural Barriers to Rehabilitation of the Handicapped, which issued 
recommendations in a report that would presage future legislation.61 Congress 
enacted the Architectural Barriers Act in 1968, requiring federal facilities to be fully 
accessible to people with disabilities. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 created the 
Access Board (originally named the “Architectural and Transportation Barriers 
Compliance Board”), which is the federal agency responsible for monitoring 
compliance with federal laws mandating accessibility in public accommodations.62 
Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990, and charged the 
Access Board with developing the accessibility guidelines and standards necessary 
for the execution of this ground-breaking civil rights legislation.  
 The Access Board has published a design guide for planners that outlines the 
safety problems inherent in the sidewalk-curb-street transition a pedestrian must make 
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to cross the street in high-traffic areas. Even though traffic engineers and urban 
planners know more now than they ever have about methods of designing streets so 
that pedestrian and automobile can peacefully coexist, able-bodied and disabled 
pedestrians alike still find themselves at war with vehicles when it comes to crossing 
the street. According to the Access Board, the radii of curbs have steadily grown in 
order to accommodate trucks’ and buses’ longer wheelbases. The “curb radius” is an 
engineering term that describes how sharp a turn a driver must make at the corner of 
an intersection.63 A large curb radius enables vehicles to go around corners more 
quickly, while a small curb radius slows down vehicles that are turning the corner.64 
A bigger curb radius means there is less space on the sidewalk for signs, signal 
standards, and other necessary hardware, and thus decreases the “pedestrian 
platooning space” at the corners. In other words, pedestrians are waiting to cross the 
street in an area that lies outside a driver’s field of vision. The larger the curb radius, 
the more risky the intersection is for pedestrians, because it increases the distance a 
pedestrian must walk to get across the street. Drivers can turn the corners at these 
intersections at higher speeds, have advantages of time and momentum over 
pedestrians, and often fail to yield to them.  
Street crossings are longer where radii are large, and 
pedestrians who do not start at the beginning of a WALK 
cycle may not be able to complete a crossing in the  
allotted time. Those who travel more slowly or must 
wait to start until they can confirm the start of the  
                                                
63 City of Santa Cruz, California, “Mission Pedestrian,” City of Santa Cruz, California, 
http://www.missionped.org/archive/curbrad.html (accessed 13 April 2008). 
64 Ibid. See also United States Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, “A 
Walkable Community,” Publication No. FHWA-SA-00-010. 
 30 
pedestrian interval may be discouraged from attempting 
to cross at such intersections.65 
 
Just as planners and traffic engineers fail to account for people who are disabled—or 
merely slow or cautious—when they design curbs, they also overlook this 
constituency when they factor crossing time into the length of a red (or green) light. 
According to the Access Board, the average walking speed of able-bodied adults is 
four feet per second; this is not sufficient for pedestrians who pause before crossing 
the street, “or whose walking speed is affected by a mobility impairment, stamina, or 
age. Pedestrians who are blind or have low vision, those who have cognitive 
disabilities, and elderly pedestrians typically delay leaving the curb until they can 
satisfy themselves that vehicles have stopped.”66  
In contrast to the four-feet-per-second walking speed of an able-bodied adult, 
a person who is impaired in gait or stamina will usually walk at a rate of only 1.5 feet 
per second, yet transportation industry researchers recommend that signals be timed 
for a speed of approximately 3.1 feet per second.67 In the case of sidewalks and 
streets, the built environment itself inhibits the free movement of people in public 
spaces. Some planners recognize this fact: “[t]he pedestrian realm is therefore an 
emergent product of physical design, the regulation of movement behavior by traffic 
lights and signs, and the patterns of use established by the behavior of pedestrians and 
drivers.” 68 Poor intersection design, ineffective traffic regulation, and insensitive 
engineers have all contributed to the disappearance of the pedestrian realm. The 
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genesis of this loss occurred in the 1890s with the paving revolution and has 
continued unabated. And, while the street is a dangerous place for pedestrians in the 
twenty-first century, it was even more so in the early decades of the twentieth 
century. Simply crossing the street entailed great risk. 
Newly arrived immigrants, children, and others who were not familiar with 
the speed and lethality of automobiles were at the highest risk of injury or death from 
the motor vehicles using the new commercial arteries.69 Typical of the times was an 
article appearing in the Indianapolis News in 1923 that mentioned two girls, ages 
seven and nine, who were hospitalized after being struck by speeding motorists on 
New York Street. This incident resulted in a temporary crackdown on speeders by 
police, who arrested eight motorists for speeding the night of the accident.70 In the 
state of Connecticut for the years 1924 and 1925, the number-one cause of motor 
vehicle accidents was “recklessness of motorists,” while “carelessness of adult 
pedestrian” ranked as the third most prevalent cause, and “carelessness of child 
pedestrian” ranked fifth (out of seven possible causes of accidents).71 For both classes 
of pedestrians, simply crossing the street ranked as by far the most dangerous 
activity.72 Likewise, statistics from the state of New York demonstrate that the most 
frequent type of motor vehicle accident in early 1925 involved a collision with a 
pedestrian. Most pedestrians were walking, running, or playing in the street when 
they were hit; this behavior was more than two times more frequent than the next 
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biggest cause of collisions, which was crossing at an intersection with no signal.73 
Along with the pedestrians’ ignorance, of course, the sheer volume of motor vehicles 
was an important contributing factor to the problem of safety.  
In 1914, only 1.7 million automobiles were registered in the United States.74 
By 1920, over 8.9 million autos were registered, and in 1922, the figure jumped to 
over 12.3 million.75 In Indianapolis, the population in 1923 was 340,882, and the total 
estimated number of motor vehicles in the city was 34,088. Engineers estimated that 
the total number of all types of vehicles entering the city’s central business district 
each day was 8,522; automobiles comprised roughly half of that total, or 4,771.76 
Clearly, the numbers of autos on the city’s streets were skyrocketing in the early 
twentieth century. The typical traffic engineer’s answer to this problem was to widen 
the existing streets, and then to plan future street widths accordingly to avoid 
congestion. In 1917, one engineer even advocated “widening the roadway by 
appropriating practically all of the sidewalk space and . . . placing the sidewalks in 
arcades back of the building line” in extreme cases.77 No mention was made of the 
fact that such an architectural rearrangement might inconvenience pedestrians. 
Having already lost the street, urban dwellers were threatened with losing the 
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sidewalks. Thankfully, most cities opted to keep their sidewalks along the fronts of 
buildings. 
Aside from widening the streets, city leaders had other options available to 
them: they could station police officers at busy intersections during rush hours to 
control the flow of pedestrians and to ensure vehicular traffic stopped; and, they could 
enact regulations and ordinances. The members of Indianapolis’ city government 
were enthusiastic regulators in the 1910s. In his annual speech of 1916 to the 
Indianapolis Common Council, Mayor Joseph E. Bell championed his 
administration’s efforts to solve traffic safety problems by regulating the behavior of 
pedestrians.78 First, the city created safety zones so that people could wait for 
streetcars without the fear of being hit by oncoming traffic. These safety zones were 
located in the middle of the street, near the streetcar tracks, and were designated 
waiting areas “marked by standards connected with chains.”79 According to Mayor 
Bell in a 1918 speech to the Common Council, “this method of handling traffic has 
been shown to be so practical that the system established in this city has been adopted 
by many other cities of the country.”80 These “islands of safety” were also useful for 
pedestrians not waiting for streetcars as places where they could stop and safely rest if 
they needed to. It was necessary for a thoroughfare to be wide enough to 
accommodate a safety island.81 If a street did not meet minimum width requirements 
(or did not have a streetcar line running through it), the city could not install an 
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island. Instead, city leaders used other means, namely regulating pedestrian behavior, 
to address the dangerous situation posed by fast-moving traffic and unwary walkers.  
The Common Council of Indianapolis had previously enacted traffic 
ordinances regulating drivers’ behavior on the streets, but in 1915 the council passed 
General Ordinance 25,1915, regulating pedestrians’ behavior. The ordinance 
specified where and when pedestrians could cross the street, and also how they could 
cross it (not diagonally). The ordinance also established safety zones on the street for 
pedestrians, from which vehicular traffic was excluded between 6:00 A.M. and 7:00 
P.M.82 As with the safety zones, the regulation of pedestrian behavior attracted 
national attention and national emulation. In his 1916 address to the council, Mayor 
Bell proudly noted that the June, 1916 issue of The American Magazine contained an 
article by Frederick Upham Adams “commending the Indianapolis method for 
handling traffic. Concerning the Indianapolis method of handling traffic he says: 
‘What Shall Be Done With Pedestrians? ‘[I]t is not so easy to suggest a remedy for 
the intrusion of the foot passenger on street spaces which should be reserved 
exclusively for vehicular traffic . . . .’”83 Mayor Bell then quoted at some length 
Adams’ laudatory comments: 
As near as I can ascertain, Indianapolis has the credit for 
taking the initial steps in the United States in this direction. 
In all the congested districts of that city the pedestrian is 
forced by municipal regulations to cooperate with the  
drivers of vehicles and with the police in expediting the 
movement of this traffic and preventing injury to life and 
limb. The pedestrian is privileged to cross these streets at 
the legally designated places only, and these places are marked 
and properly guarded. If he crosses at any other place he 
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is arrested. Detroit and Cleveland are moving in the same 
directions. It is reasonable to expect that other cities will  
follow this initiative. There should be immediate and  
widespread imitation of the example set by Indianapolis.84 
 
Adams’ bias against pedestrians is quite evident in the excerpt Mayor Bell quoted in 
his speech. Adams seems to have felt that streets were for vehicular traffic, and that 
“foot passengers” who needed to cross those streets were intruders, by nature 
uncooperative sorts who did not fully appreciate what a privilege it was to be allowed 
to cross the street.  
 The Common Council kept refining its traffic ordinances with respect to both 
vehicles and pedestrians. Typical language is found in General Ordinance 37,1919, 
which contained section 14 concerning pedestrians: “All pedestrians crossing streets 
at street intersections in the Congested District shall cross at right angles and shall not 
cross diagonally at such intersections. Such pedestrians shall cross only on the signal 
of the traffic officers, if one is stationed at such crossing, and shall move only in the 
same direction as the traffic.”85 The pedestrians seemed to have had no one lobbying 
for them—they were a constituency without a voice. Not so with motorists, who had 
the local version of the American Automobile Association, the Hoosier Motor Club. 
According to Warren F. Curry, writing in the club’s publication of the Official 
Indianapolis Traffic Code: 1936, the club began its existence in Indianapolis in 1902, 
when “the horse and buggy enthusiasts made life miserable for the chugging motorist 
and his poorly constructed tires. Motorists had to organize for sympathy and 
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protection.”86 Curry wrote that as the “automobile industry grew, the need for motor 
clubs grew. There were roads to be paved and made safer, and driving rules must be 
made and observed for safety on the highways.” Curry believed the Hoosier Motor 
Club deserved credit for making the streets safer for pedestrians; he stated that the 
club “sponsored all safety measures for making the streets safer for pedestrians,” 
although he did not specify those measures. He was able to list several safety 
advances for motorists for which the club claimed responsibility, including safety 
glass, rearview mirrors, windshield wipers, a standard signaling system, the 
elimination of “glaring” headlights, and the provision of stop lights.87 Finally, Curry 
cited the club’s work to protect children in and near school zones as proof that the 
association of motorists was a force for positive social change. 
 In the early twentieth century, before motor vehicles totally took over the 
streets in Indianapolis, the city provided “comfort stations”—public restrooms—on 
those streets. Figure 3 depicts a men’s public comfort station, apparently right in the 
middle of Washington Street, in 1911. The women’s room is depicted in Figure 4—it 
is not obvious whether that facility was also located in the middle of the street. These 
public comfort stations stood as a testament to the fact that the city’s streets were 
originally designed to at least be shared by pedestrians and drivers. The street was 
originally meant to be accessible to people, and gradually evolved into having as its 
primary purpose the circulation of motorized traffic. The public space in the street 
evolved from welcoming and accommodating people to accommodating commerce. 
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Figure 3. “Public Comfort Station for Men, Washington Street, 1911” (Bass #24723), The W.H. Bass 
Photo Company, Indiana Historical Society, folder 405_doc33.jpg, Box 60, Folder 3. 
 
 
Figure 4. “Public Comfort Station for Women, Washington Street, 1911” (Bass #24702), The W.H. 
Bass Photo Company, Indiana Historical Society, folder 405_doc.32.jpg, Box 60, Folder 3. 
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There were certainly class issues dividing pedestrians and motorists. Until 
Henry Ford mass-produced his cars and offered them at a price the masses could 
afford, only people with a certain income level could drive. According to historian 
Peter Baldwin, “by the 1910s, the advocates of traffic flow tended to be those who 
could afford automobiles.”88 The rich and elite were the motorists, while the poor, the 
young, and the immigrants were those who were most likely to be injured by the 
motorists. By and large, the motorists also had the government on their side. Most of 
the efforts of the legislative branch in Indianapolis centered on supporting the easy 
movement of traffic, unimpeded by pedestrians except at predictable intervals.  
The rich and elite classes doubtless possessed a certain degree of power, but 
so did the mainstays of the Progressive Era reforms and innovations: the experts. 
Experts dominated the decisions of local government just as surely as political 
parties, machines, and bosses did during this time. Like mayors and council members, 
experts such as sanitation engineers, traffic engineers, architects, public health 
authorities, and landscape architects were asserting control over the design, use, and 
placement of streets and other elements of infrastructure between 1890 and 1930. 
Relying on technology and education and removed from the vagaries of electoral 
politics by virtue of civil service positions, Progressive Era experts made decisions 
that would affect residents of cities into the next century. Experts were pragmatic men 
concerned with the future of the cities they advised, and the wave of the future in the 
early 1910s was city planning and zoning. 
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Chapter Three: Zoning and Planning 
 On the evening of 12 July 1893, historian Frederick Jackson Turner read his 
famous essay entitled “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” at the 
World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago.89 In that classic piece, Turner described 
the unique American character, tracked the nation’s expansion and development 
along the western frontier, and marked the closing of that frontier. True, settlers had 
reached the Pacific Ocean, but what Turner did not express was that a new frontier 
awaited those who were willing to try to conquer it—the rough, anarchic, filthy, 
disorganized American city. There was a group of American experts who were eager 
to tackle that frontier, however. Progressive Era reformers sought to manage, 
organize, and “settle” the city literally according to plan, through the instruments of 
city planning and zoning. A variety of western pioneers had tamed the great 
wilderness. A variety of urban experts wished to domesticate the city, just as they 
wished to Americanize the great concentrations of southern and eastern European 
immigrants dwelling in those cities. 
 Many U.S. cities in the early twentieth century shared a similar set of 
problems: substandard housing conditions, inadequate or nonexistent greenspaces, 
rapid—and unregulated—industrial growth, uneven provision of utilities, and 
questionable sanitation practices. Architects, landscape architects, civil engineers, 
planners, and politicians looked to Europe for solutions to these problems, 
specifically Germany and Great Britain.90 Rather than allowing industrial, residential, 
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commercial, and agricultural concerns to locate side-by-side in an impromptu 
manner, the Germans had imposed zoning and transportation systems on their cities. 
The English used a comprehensive plan. The basic ideas of both approaches were the 
same:  
[encourage]  private enterprise to build at the edge of  
cities to relieve congestion. By redistributing the middle 
class to the outlying urban areas it was believed that  
pressures for housing would be relieved and lower-income 
people could obtain better housing. Theoretically, older 
housing was to serve as a ground for upward social mobility, 
while home ownership in new areas would establish social 
and economic stability. By advocating redistribution of the 
population into outlying areas, providing fast and low-cost 
transportation, and enticing industry to locate at the fringe, 
it was thought that city density would decrease.91 
 
The vehicle for introducing these concepts of “scientific city planning” into the 
political discourse and the public sector was the City Planning Conference. The first 
such conference was held in Washington, DC, in 1909, and was convened by the New 
York Committee on Congestion of Population.92 Members of several organizations 
came together in Washington to discuss the difficult problems presented by growing 
cities: the Committee on Congestion of Population in New York; the American 
Institute of Architects; the American Society of Landscape Architects; the League of 
American Municipalities; the American Civic Association; and the National 
Conference of Charities and Correction.93 These groups formed the nucleus of the 
conferences year after year, and the records of their conclaves prove that the 
American ideal of a classless society was a fiction. When it came to the problem of 
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housing the masses of people who inhabited U.S. cities, one’s socioeconomic status 
dictated the quality of one’s residence. 
 At the 1911 conference held in Philadelphia, Lawrence Veiller, the secretary 
and director of the National Housing Association in New York City, presented a 
paper entitled, “Buildings in Relation to Street and Site.”94 Veiller discussed the 
problem with existing city designs and cited Indianapolis as emblematic: 
“Indianapolis, with a similar radial system, finds that it has to reckon with a serious 
slum problem; and so one might go through the roster of cities which have developed 
intelligent city plans and point out similar conditions.”95 Veiller stressed the 
importance of lot size, and noted that lots in major U.S. cities varied in depth from 
fifty to two hundred feet, with most being simply too deep.96 This condition was 
symptomatic of city planners’ desires to pave and maintain as few streets as possible, 
thus laying out large blocks. He believed that such a situation was desirable for “the 
better class of residences” but intolerable once those residences were divided up by 
landlords and used first as boardinghouses, then as tenements. Once people crowded 
into the tenements, conditions became unsanitary and deplorable. 
 Veiller’s solution was to adopt the German system of zoning, which would 
divide a city along rigid lines, meaning that the residential area would never co-
mingle with the industrial area. In other words, industry would be told where it could 
build, so as not to intrude on residential areas with noise and odors. Likewise, people 
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would be told where to live, they would obediently (and cleanly) live there, and that 
would be that. A person’s income and social standing would dictate lot sizes.  
We could then proceed to lay out our cities with one depth 
of lot for our high-class residence districts, giving to the men 
who could pay for it as much land as they could afford to keep 
idle, and laying out the districts in which the poor live on a  
different basis with shallow lots, giving to them the amount 
of land for which they could afford to pay without carrying 
upon their shoulders any undue burden of rent, nor without 
forcing the community to bear undue burdens through  
congestion of population with all that that implies.97 
 
Veiller was certain he knew what was best for the “ordinary laborer” in terms of 
housing, lot size, and paying for the same. “Higher-paid mechanics” could pay 
twenty-five dollars a month rent and were thus entitled to housing similar to that 
experienced by those who lived in the “fashionable part of town.” “But for the 
ordinary laborer, especially the large foreign population which is coming to 
predominate in our American cities, the detached house is not desirable,” he 
maintained.98  
Why not? First, there was the matter of simple economics: the “common 
unskilled laborer of the type just described” could not afford all of that land. 
According to Veiller, it was nothing less than “Utopian” to assert that such a person 
(a member of “this class of population”) was entitled to a “beautiful flower garden.” 
Even a vegetable garden where the family could grow fresh produce for their own 
meals was too far-fetched, Vieller opined, because when the father worked a ten-hour 
day and the mother properly attended to her children, there was no free time for 
tending a garden. Empty, unused land would thus become nothing more than an 
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unsightly, bare patch of grass and ultimately (in the backyard) a garbage dump. In 
short order, the housing would become an eyesore. “It would be far better in most 
cities if the houses were built solidly against each other.”99 Veiller’s system allotted a 
lot depth of one hundred twenty-five feet for “high-class residence purposes,” a depth 
of fifty feet for “the better paid artisans and mechanics,” and “for the homes of the 
unskilled laborer and what we call ‘the poor’ the lots should be twenty-five feet in 
depth.” City blocks would be radically different under Veiller’s plan. As for alleys, 
they were both a blessing and a curse. Veiller offered a pungent description of the 
condition of contemporary urban alleys in 1911, with no indoor toilets, no storm 
sewers, no regular municipal garbage collection, and no pavement.100 Veiller believed 
some citizens were different from others. Those who were foreign-born, poor, and 
who worked at low-paying jobs required a different type of housing than their more 
prosperous neighbors. Veiller was a classic Progressive Era reformer; he sincerely 
desired to rectify the appalling housing conditions that were prevalent in large U.S. 
cities during this period. But his ideas were not the only possible solution to the 
problem.  
 In the discussion that followed the presentation of Veiller’s paper, there was a 
dissenting voice: Irving K. Pond was from Chicago, and he was the president of the 
American Institute of Architects. He placed responsibility for ugly slums on the 
architects who designed them and blame for the polluted alleys on the cities that did 
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not adequately police them. Pond advocated for larger blocks in order to provide 
urban dwellers with greenspaces and breathing room:101  
[w]e are not so concerned with the owners of the fine 
houses and large grounds,--they can well be relied upon 
to protect themselves,--but we are concerned that the  
mothers of the tenements may have their burdens  
lightened, and the children of the tenements may have 
sunlight and air and grass and flowers and the convenient 
and easily accessible public playground. So every factory 
district—every tenement district—should be provided with 
open spaces in liberal proportion to the population. 
 
The very people at the heart of this spirited but polite debate—the workers and 
families themselves—were not present at the conference. The assembled experts 
labored to find solutions to the problems of urban life separately from the people they 
endeavored to help.  
The Proceedings listed the vital statistics for all major cities (including 
Indianapolis) after Veiller’s remarks. As of May, 1911, the Hoosier capital’s 
population was 255,340. Its average street width was fifty to sixty feet, and the 
average lot depth was a generous 150 feet. The average block depth was a relatively 
spacious 365 feet, and the width of the alleys was twelve to fifteen feet. The average 
heights, in stories, of its buildings were one and a half to three stories.102 Judging 
from these statistics, the city of Indianapolis appeared to be more liberal in its 
allotment of living space to families than the expert city planners would have 
recommended. While it is possible that Indianapolis was a more egalitarian city than 
the planners’ ideal metropolis, it may have been just as likely that the leaders of the 
city simply had no plan at all for its growth.  
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In 1912, the members of the Fourth National Conference on City Planning 
spent much time discussing issues of financing for cities. Later, B. Antrim Haldeman, 
assistant engineer at the Bureau of Surveys in Philadelphia, presented a paper entitled, 
“The Control of Municipal Development by the ‘Zone System’ and Its Application in 
the U.S.”103 Haldeman described the zoning system in Europe, especially in 
Germany. According to Haldeman, the general theory behind the concept of zoning 
was that the buildings “should be lower and farther apart the greater their distance . . . 
from the center of the city[.] [T]he arrangement is not one of concentric girdles . . . 
but a division into districts, irregular as to area and boundary and regulated in 
accordance with some local characteristic or special adaptability for certain classes of 
buildings.”104 He cautioned that the Germans exercised both “keen judgment and 
great care” in determining boundaries and imposing regulations, and that German 
officials still faced much opposition in some cases. Haldeman described the salutary 
results the Germans had obtained: “the industrial classes of Germany have been 
translated from hovels and dens reeking with disease, degeneracy, and vice, to 
pleasant homes, surrounded with all the comforts, conveniences, and privileges that 
make for health, happiness, and good citizenship . . . . ”105 Haldeman then specified 
how the Germans reached this state of affairs: “this has been accomplished mainly by 
breaching the one-time sacred wall of vested rights and establishing the principle that 
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the economic progress of the nation and the integrity of its social fabric transcend the 
fabric of the individual.”106  
Haldeman mused whether such a scheme would work in the United States. He 
was convinced that American cities could benefit from zoning laws, but identified 
barriers to their adoption, including the view that zoning would be “regarded as an 
unwarranted invasion of vested property rights incompatible with the American ideas 
of freedom[.]”107 He named potential opponents, including land owners, real estate 
concerns, the construction and building firms, and “large interests not directly 
concerned in the development of land,” as well as incompetent (and insufficiently 
bureaucratic) municipal governments and existing laws.108 Haldeman’s ideas were 
seconded by conferees from Philadelphia and Newark.109  
 The city of Indianapolis—indeed, the entire state of Indiana—was a late 
arrival to these zoning and planning discussions. In 1917, Albert H. Schaaf of Fort 
Wayne spoke at the Ninth National Conference on City Planning in Kansas City, 
Missouri, about “A State Campaign for City Planning.”110 Schaaf reported that city 
officials and real estate professionals from throughout the state, anxious to catch up 
with the rest of the country and begin applying principles of scientific city planning 
and zoning, were seeking enabling legislation from the Indiana General Assembly. 
The then-president of the Indiana State Association of Real Estate Men, Lee J. Ninde, 
toured the entire state in his automobile (something that would capture the 
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imagination of many Hoosiers in the 1910s). Ninde brought with him experts on city 
planning and zoning, and they met with city officials and interest groups (real estate, 
housing, civic associations, Chambers of Commerce, etc.) in sixteen cities, including 
Fort Wayne, Elkhart, South Bend, Michigan City, Gary, Hammond, Kokomo, 
Lafayette, Terre Haute, and Evansville. The tour received generous media coverage in 
newspapers and magazines. The organizers also put together an exhibition from the 
City Planning Bureau that they displayed in Evansville, Indianapolis, South Bend, 
and other cities. After all of that effort, the bill did not pass. Schaaf attributed its 
failure to the legislature’s attention to other pressing issues, namely passing a 
“prohibition law, the women’s suffrage law, and the constitutional amendment 
bill.”111 He believed the General Assembly simply ran out of time to consider the city 
planning and zoning measure after it dealt with all of those other matters. It would 
take a few more years before the state passed legislation enabling the creation of city 
planning commissions with zoning authority—Indianapolis established its City Plan 
Commission in 1921. 
 At the Tenth National Conference on City Planning, held in 1918 in St. Louis, 
conferees continued to debate whose needs to put first when devising a city plan or 
zoning system: those of its residents, or those of its industries and trades. They also 
discussed where apartments should be allowed (acceptable in the central business 
district, not so in the suburbs), and tackled the question of whether a family required a 
minimum land area.112 They then engaged in an animated discussion involving 
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industrial zoning. Herbert S. Swan, the executive secretary of the Zoning Committee 
of New York City, presented a paper entitled, “Industrial Zoning in Practice.”113 He 
advocated excluding residences from heavy manufacturing districts for public health 
reasons, and also because such a practice would promote the efficient use of space 
allocated for manufacturing. Swan argued for a balance between residential 
populations and industrial development. A discussion ensued about whether planners 
could actually compel people to live a certain distance from their workplaces, 
especially when different members of the same family worked at different locations, 
and when people changed jobs frequently.114  
Despite their concerns with public health and keeping residential districts 
segregated from industrial zones, the conferees had to face facts: most workers 
preferred to live close by their workplaces, preferably within walking distance. E.P. 
Goodrich, consulting engineer in New York City, related an instructive anecdote 
about a manufacturer who was considering relocating his plant: 
It was in Brooklyn. He was making especially high-grade stuff  
of some kind, ladies’ waists or millinery. He had been employing 
a certain class of German girls. They had been pushed out by 
the Jewish invasion and this German colony had re-established 
itself in another part of Brooklyn. He absolutely had to go to 
his working people. He wanted to put his factory there where 
those people could come to him, and they wanted to come to 
him, but wouldn’t come to him where he was located.115 
 
Goodrich further observed that in Detroit, some workers at the Ford facilities traveled 
“three hours a day back and forth,” and noted that it is “much easier to provide houses 
adjacent to a large plant, in which case they would actually be used . . . . ” He said 
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that “[p]eople usually do stay within bounds. They may like to move about within a 
district, but they will not go outside the 5-cent zone if they can help it, and will not go 
outside of walking distance if they can help that.”116 Goodrich was correct—workers, 
being human, possessed free will, and chose to live where they would. Meanwhile, in 
the city of Indianapolis, while the General Assembly debated the issue of zoning 
laws, residential areas were intermingling with industrial plants as the city inexorably 
grew. The legislature’s delay would result in long-term health consequences for the 
residents of those neighborhoods. 
 Finally, at the Thirteenth National Conference on City Planning in Pittsburgh 
in 1921, representatives from Indiana could claim success. Alexander W. McKeand 
gave the following report: 
Indiana is very new in city planning since our law which 
covers both city planning and zoning will not be effective 
until early in June of this year. However several cities in 
the state have done much preliminary work and in my own 
city of Terre Haute we are completing our surveys for a  
park and boulevard system.117  
 
The delay in passing the legislation would directly and adversely affect the situation 
in Indianapolis, as existing residential enclaves and industrial and manufacturing 
concerns would have to be “grandfathered in” to any zoning scheme.  
 In 1923, at the Fifteenth National Conference on City Planning, one focus was 
on regional planning. In relation to that issue, George B. Ford of New York presented 
his paper entitled, “Regional and Metropolitan Planning Principles, Methods, Co-
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operation.”118 Ford and his fellow conferees were still trying to deal with the 
intractable problem of workers’ insistence on living close to their urban workplaces, 
which went against the fundamental principles of the German zoning system. “As 
long as the great majority of the inhabitants of a metropolitan area continue to earn 
their livelihood in the central city, decentralization will be difficult, if not impossible 
. . . This means that industry and wholesale business must be legislated or pushed or 
encouraged to move out into the suburbs.”119 Ford noted that while governments 
might be willing to help planners out by requiring industries to move to designated 
areas, planners were still left with the problem of what to do with the workers.  
Investigation would seem to show that some of the chief  
reasons why the workers will not move out to the  
neighborhood of the outlying industrial plants is because 
it is difficult to find desirable, cheap housing in the vicinity. 
Then, too, school facilities are apt to be poor, churches and 
sect groups, theatres, billiard parlors and other leisure time 
employments are lacking or inadequate; it is difficult for  
their friends or compatriots to get in and out to see  
them and if the worker loses his job he has to pull up 
stakes and move to some other part of the metropolitan 
area where he can get work.120 
 
Ford seemed to understand that job insecurity and substandard wages contributed to 
this problem, but neither he nor his fellow discussants mentioned solutions entailing 
changes of behavior on the part of the employers such as paying a living wage or 
building mass transit systems with cheap fares.  
 Veiller’s 1911 themes of population density, how much space a person 
required, and whether that requirement varied by social standing, ran throughout 
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Ford’s presentation. Ford continually made reference to the concept of “load on the 
land,” a notion developed by Harland Bartholomew that purported to “arrive at 
desirable standards of population distribution.” Ford argued that one could use 
Bartholomew’s theory to determine standards for optimum placement of regional 
industrial areas as well as certain dwellings, namely tenements. Ford stated that “there 
is little economic or social reason why more than 12 per cent. of the population of any 
district should live in houses containing more than two families . . . Realizing that the 
majority of tenement dwellers work in industrial plants, these facts indicate 
approximately the amount of tenement area which regional zoning should provide 
about suburban industrial plants.”121 Ford returned to the refrain sung by the city 
planners since 1911: the amount of space a person needed—and the density the land 
could tolerate and support—seemed to be related to individual socioeconomic status. 
The voices of Indianapolis planners were mostly absent from these conferences, 
probably because the city was not engaged in any kind of official planning process. 
City leaders had attempted to plan certain parts of the city over the years, despite the 
absence of any legal sanction. Part of this piecemeal approach included hiring the 
famed landscape architect (and participant in at least one of the National Conferences 
on City Planning), George E. Kessler. 
 In 1909, the Indianapolis Board of Park Commissioners issued its fifteenth 
annual report. The commissioners had paid Kessler $3,600 in salary and $300.16 for 
expenses that year.122 Kessler’s contribution to the report (“Report of Landscape 
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Architect”) totaled five pages and included a direct criticism of his clients’ efforts to 
date: 
In your fundamental planning, the central business 
district was built upon broad lines, with wide streets 
and ample proportions and with splendid diagonal  
thoroughfares reaching out in the different directions 
from the business center. In your later period of  
development an evidently penurious and entirely 
mistaken system of street planning was permitted 
to creep in, resulting in a lack of wide streets and 
in failure even properly to continue those which had 
begun when your citizens had a better conception of 
your future than those of the immediate past seem to 
have had. The work, therefore, devolving upon your 
Board in re-establishing these lines of communication 
will necessarily involve considerably greater effort and cost.123 
 
Kessler’s analysis was perceptive. He described the mile square which formed the 
city’s center, and was absolutely correct in observing that the layout of the city just 
seemed to stop beyond those elegant “diagonal thoroughfares.” Once the city 
expanded outside of those borders, there had been little attempt to control its growth 
or deliberately design the placement of streets and other spaces on the grid. He was 
also correct in realizing that the taxpayers would pay a higher price for any attempt to 
make up for lost time. He noted that other cities of comparable size had found it 
worthwhile to deliberately plan a park system and parkways, though. In his report, he 
highlighted the importance and value of the city’s waterways: the “salient and most 
important portion of the present movement in the re-creation of a beautiful 
Indianapolis is based upon the existence of the streams flowing through the city.”124 
He believed that all of the waterways (and their adjacent parks) should be connected 
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with each other, and that such an arrangement would help tie the city together 
visually. He envisioned residents driving on big boulevards along developed and 
beautified stream banks, people enjoying scenic parkways, and the entire system 
culminating in a park stretching from the Capitol building westward to White 
River.125 
 Kessler felt it was most imperative that the city’s leaders work to unify and tie 
together the “different and widely separated districts of the city” that had resulted 
from the failure to deliberately plan its growth.126 He believed a systematic 
arrangement of parks along the city’s rivers and streams would accomplish this urgent 
mission. Other than the Board of Park Commissioners going to the Common Council 
of the city in order to obtain the funding and labor, there was no other way to follow 
through on Kessler’s recommendations. The council, in turn, was operating without a 
mandate from the state regarding city planning and zoning regulations. In other 
words, the city in 1909 lacked a “planning czar” who could ensure the fulfillment of 
Kessler’s plans. The city would not receive the legal authority for planning and 
zoning from the state until a statewide law was approved on 10 March 1921. It is 
difficult to ascertain the reasons for the delay in Indiana’s adoption of a statewide 
law. Were there partisan rivalries that held the measure hostage? Were the state’s 
lawmakers loath to take a chance on an idea (zoning) imported from Europe? Did 
they feel it was unnecessary? Were they being overly cautious? Were the mostly rural 
legislators indifferent to the concerns of the state’s few large cities? While the reasons 
for the delay are unknown, the costs of the state’s aversion to zoning and planning 
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authority quickly became apparent once Indianapolis’s city leaders began to try to 
implement the law and exercise that authority. 
 At a meeting on 4 April 1921, the Common Council of Indianapolis passed 
General Ordinance 25 by a unanimous vote. That measure created a City Plan 
Commission consisting of nine members. The mayor signed the ordinance on 15 
April of that year.127 The members of the City Plan Commission set about the task of 
compiling a report on the city’s layout complete with recommendations. They hired 
Robert H. Whitten of Cleveland, Ohio, as a consultant.128 Whitten had presented a 
paper at the Tenth National Conference on City Planning in St. Louis in 1918 
discussing residential zoning and whether families required minimum land areas (see 
footnote 112, above). He had also worked for New York City and Atlanta. The 
commission submitted its final report with recommendations to the Common Council 
on 16 October 1922. The members of the commission notified the Council that they 
would be submitting a formal draft of an ordinance soon. 
 On 6 November 1922, Councilman King introduced General Ordinance 114, 
1922.129 This zoning ordinance was the fruit of the City Plan Commission’s labor; it 
was read and referred to the Committee on Law and the Judiciary. After three 
amendments, the ordinance passed unanimously on 20 November 1922, and the 
mayor signed it on 27 November 1922.130 With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to 
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see that the city’s officials were walking a fine line with this ordinance. By late 1922, 
much of the infrastructure of the city was already in place: streets, utilities, sewerage, 
neighborhoods, schools, parks, industry, and manufacturing. So, the council members 
could write a law that planned the city they would like to see in the future, but they 
could not erase what had already been written in terms of where people lived, 
worked, recreated, and took their garbage. City planners could not simply go into 
these areas and eject residents or businesses on the basis of their locations. G.O. 
114,1922 established seven classes of structures ranging from U1 (dwellings, schools, 
etc.) to U2 (apartments and hotels) to U3 (banks, restaurants, etc.) to U4 (cold storage 
facilities, scrap iron, etc.) to U5 (coke ovens, soap manufacturing, etc.) to U6 (acid 
manufacturing, stockyards, etc.) and ending with U7 (amusement parks, penal 
institutions, etc., including sewage disposal or treatment plants, refuse dumps, and 
garbage disposal plants)—and had to grandfather in existing class U7s, the least 
desirable and/or most noxious concerns.131 Why? Because by 1922, the southwest 
side of the city had already been well-established as not only a residential and 
industrial area, but also as the city’s garbage can. The city’s dump (then referred to as 
Sellers Farm) and sewage treatment plant (finally under construction in the early 
1920s) were both on Harding Street in the block between Raymond and Troy, in the 
area depicted in Appendix 2.  
The ordinance also gave authority to the Board of Zoning Appeals (after 
notice to the public and a hearing) to deviate from the above regulations. According 
to Section 23(5), the Board of Zoning Appeals could  
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[p]ermit the location of a telephone exchange, electric 
substation or similar public utility, or of a class U7 use 
in any use district, provided such use in such location 
will in the judgment of the board of zoning appeals 
substantially serve the public convenience and welfare 
and will not substantially and permanently injure the 
appropriate use of the neighboring property.132 
 
Although the new law gave the Board of Zoning Appeals much power, the city’s 
leaders recognized the harsh reality of the situation: as powerful as they were to chart 
the course of the city’s development from 1922 onward, they would all have to live 
with the status quo. This situation condemned residents of some neighborhoods to 
living in less healthful environments, in close proximity to established industries and 
waste processing facilities. Unfortunately, city leaders did not enact measures that 
could have ameliorated the long-term consequences of this situation, such as the 
establishment of a low-cost public transit system that could enable workers to live 
some distance from their workplaces.  
 The efforts of city planners and other urban officials epitomized power 
wielded by a new kind of insiders—during the Progressive Era, wealth and riches 
were not necessary entrées to power so much as credentials and expertise. With 
respect to matters of infrastructure, it was the technocrats who comprised the ranks of 
the elite, not members of a political machine. By 1924, the planners were even 
seriously discussing the merits of a national plan.133 A national plan would only serve 
to increase the experts’ prestige. 
The officials of the city of Indianapolis were probably more modest in their 
aspirations—the delays effected by the state legislature all but guaranteed their efforts 
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would be too little, too late. Whether the delays were due to political antipathy at the 
state level or a stunning failure of leadership from the city of Indianapolis, the fact 
remains that the people whose lives were directly affected by the measures under 
consideration did not receive a proactive zoning scheme, only a reactive one. Thanks 
to this legacy, the residents of the southwest side of the city especially have regularly 
contended with neighbors like heavy industries and waste processing facilities since 
1921. The delay in passing a zoning law was one of the historical forces that began to 
cement the status of some Indianapolis neighborhoods as less healthy than others. In 
turn, this condition made them less desirable places to live, and their inhabitants less 
politically and economically powerful than those of other (more purely residential) 
parts of the city. In this way, political decisions about the location of infrastructure, 
improvements, and development have separated people from each other at not only 
the street level, but also the neighborhood level. Entire communities in Indianapolis 
were condemned to an unhealthy, low-status existence in part because of a flawed 
deliberative process. 
Although the delay in the passage of a zoning ordinance limited the city 
leaders’ power to control certain aspects of the city’s development, city officials 
retained ultimate control over other aspects of infrastructure. Like the city planners at 
their annual meetings, the members of the Indianapolis Common Council were not 
immune to a mentality of absolute power—during the 1910s and 1920s, they enacted 
ordinances in attempt to control not only the behavior of people on the street, but also 
who was allowed in public places. 
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Chapter Four: Regulation of Behavior 
Street infrastructure helps the police to engage in human traffic control. For 
example, in a demonstration, marchers are not allowed to leave the street or walk on 
the sidewalks so as to maintain order. Conversely, crowds watching parades, 
marches, demonstrations, rallies, or even presidential motorcades are limited to the 
sidewalk area; when they cross the curb into the street, people immediately get 
attention from law enforcement, because they are crossing a kind of boundary. One of 
the unwritten rules in our culture requires that spectators keep a certain amount of 
personal space between themselves and a procession.  
Curbs also enable the police to spot criminals. One of the most reliable visual 
indicators of lawlessness is a lack of respect for the boundary that a curb represents. 
Open-air retail drug markets, for example, are characterized by “runners” who move 
freely back and forth between the sidewalk and the street.134 Runners are the 
individuals who transport the drugs from the building where the dealer is located to 
the car where the customer is located. The boundary of the curb—the separation 
between traffic and the street and the pedestrian realm of the sidewalk—loses its 
meaning, because the runners cross it so frequently. When the police see someone 
making repeated trips to the street, to different cars, over the course of a few hours, 
they assume illegal activity is occurring. According to Grady Clay, “[t]he SCENE is 
composed of fleeting encounters, moving targets, hit-and-run sellers cruising—afoot, 
in cars, or on bikes.”135 This fluidity of movement across boundaries like curbs as a 
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characteristic of criminal activity is not a recent phenomenon. Observe the contrast 
between the people depicted in Figures 5 and 6. Figure 5 is a photograph of a parade 
on Meridian Street in Indianapolis, celebrating the opening of a bus terminal in 1925. 
The onlookers are neatly lined up along the edge of the curb. Even in the area of the 
adjacent street, in the complete absence of a curb, they instinctively continue the 
straight line in an orderly fashion. 
 
Figure 5. “Bus Terminal Opening Parade,” 1925, The W. H. Bass Photo Company, Indiana Historical 
Society, P0130_P_Box 44_Folder 5_92013-F. 
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In contrast to the orderly arrangement of souls in Figure 5, Figure 6 depicts a riot. It is 
a photograph of a streetcar riot on Pennsylvania Street in Indianapolis in 1892. Note 
the complete disregard of the curb’s traditional separation of pedestrians from the 
traffic area. 
Figure 6. “Pennsylvania Street, streetcar riot, 1892,” The W. H. Bass Photo Company, Indiana 
Historical Society, folder 404_doc 13.jpg. 
 
Who are the lawbreakers in Figure 6? The answer is easy: the people in the street. But 
what about the people in the street in Figure 5, those who are blocking the 
intersection of the cross street, but still nicely arrayed in a straight line parallel to 
Meridian Street? Technically, they are also breaking the law, but law enforcement 
officers (assuming there were some assigned to the parade that day) exercised their 
discretion and allowed them to stand there.  
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 In the years between 1890 and 1930, the men of the Indianapolis Common 
Council endeavored to regulate the behavior of people using the streets and even the 
sidewalks. In late 1915, the Common Council passed, and the mayor signed, General 
Ordinance 58,1915, a sweeping anti-loitering ordinance.136 Section 1 of the law stated 
that  
any vagrant, mendicant, beggar, prostitute, criminal, 
or person known or reputed to be such, who shall be 
found in or upon any street, alley, highway, park, or 
other public place, shed, car, car shop, out house,  
railroad depot or switch house, or place where  
intoxicating liquors are sold, or in any place of  
business, or in any business block or in the entrance 
or stairway leading thereto in the city of Indianapolis, 
shall, upon conviction, be fined not less than five dollars 
nor more than fifty dollars.137 
 
Actually, to call Section 1 of G.O. 58,1915 an “anti-loitering” ordinance is a 
misnomer. It is apparent that the first section of the law allowed the police to arrest 
anyone whom they deemed to be of ill repute for simply being out in public. Section 
2 did address loitering, and applied to any person, regardless of that person’s 
reputation or background: 
[a]ny person in or upon any street, alley, highway,  
park, or other public place, shed, car, car shop, out 
house, railroad depot or switch house, or place where 
intoxicating liquors are sold, or in any place of business, 
or in any business block or in the entrance or stairway 
leading thereto in the city of Indianapolis, who when 
requested to do so by any peace or police officer fails 
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or refuses to give account of himself, shall, upon  
conviction, be fined not less than five dollars not  
more than fifty dollars.138 
 
Section 3 prohibited “[a]ny person [from] unnecessarily associating with any 
vagrant, mendicant, beggar, criminal, or any person known or reputed to be such” in 
the same locations described in Sections 1 and 2. Finally, Section 4 targeted “[a]ny 
person unnecessarily associating in or upon” the same locations described in first two 
sections.139 This law gave the police unfettered discretion to decide who would be 
allowed to use the sidewalks, alleys, streets, and parks. People who did not obey a 
command to “move along” could be arrested and fined. These conditions are a far cry 
from Schultz’s description of nineteenth-century streets in America as extensions of 
people’s front yards. The ordinance is evidence of how the freedom of behavior that 
existed before the paving revolution disappeared concurrently with the access to the 
street the public enjoyed.  
 The next year, 1916, brought another measure from the Council aimed at 
curtailing individual freedoms in public spaces. General Ordinance 24,1916 
prohibited “the carrying of banners, placards, advertisements (for the purpose of 
displaying the same) and handbills in or upon the streets, sidewalks, alleys or other 
public places in the City of Indianapolis.”140 This ordinance passed the council on 5 
June 1916 by a vote of 7-2.141 Its only exceptions involved “processions of 
menageries, circuses, minstrel-shows, public processions, and the like exhibitions.”142 
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This ordinance illustrates that the citizens’ representatives on the Common Council 
felt empowered to dictate to their constituents what type of public expressions were in 
their best interest. The street was not completely sanitized yet, however—in 1919, the 
council passed an anti-picketing ordinance that further circumscribed public behavior, 
and in 1925 the council unanimously passed General Ordinance 40,1925, outlawing 
street peddlers both on the street and on the sidewalks.143 The 1919 anti-picketing 
ordinance, which targeted strikes and their accompanying picket lines, engendered a 
public debate about free speech. The Indianapolis Branch of the National Metal 
Trades Association published a pamphlet in favor of the ordinance that included an 
excerpt from an undated editorial in the Indianapolis News on the subject of the 
ordinance: 
[t]here is a question involved (in strike picketing) that 
is not often discussed, and that is as to the proper use 
of the streets and sidewalks. This question assumes  
considerable importance when the picketing is put in 
force in downtown streets. It undoubtedly interferes 
with the legitimate use of the sidewalks, which are  
meant for the people to use in going from one place 
to another. Men moving back and forth over a narrow 
front all day do as a matter of course obstruct traffic.  
This of course is still more true when they interfere,  
even by spoken word, with those seeking to enter the 
picketed premises. The thing is clearly a nuisance.144 
 
The editors of the Indianapolis News viewed sidewalks as conduits—structures meant 
to help people go from one place to another. The sidewalk was no longer a purely 
public venue. One’s behavior on the sidewalk was now subject to legal oversight. 
This oversight, established by the ordinances and executed by police officers with 
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broad discretion, tended to protect activities that were not threatening to the status 
quo at the expense of workers. Stopping on the sidewalk to window-shop might be 
allowable, but stopping on the sidewalk to hand someone a leaflet, or wearing a sign 
with a message of protest, was not.  
Laws like those four ordinances, passed during the period from 1890 to 1930, 
helped facilitate the evolution of urban infrastructure from facilities that enabled 
movement between places, socializing, commerce, and public health to a built 
environment that separated people. Just as the city planners sought to separate people 
by class in terms of where they lived and worked, and the traffic engineers aimed to 
separate people by mobility (motorized vehicles vs. pedestrians), the members of city 
government attempted to separate people by status (whether they were officially 
beggars, drunkards, picketers, or other undesirable types), location, behavior, and 
trade. These four laws serve as emblems of social control, and from an historical 
perspective, it is no coincidence that the members of the Indianapolis Common 
Council enacted these ordinances around the same time they considered zoning and 
planning measures. City leaders, having built the infrastructure, began to try to 
control how the public used it. The infrastructure was subject to the vagaries of 
politics while it was planned and built. These four ordinances show that those in 
power sought to politicize infrastructure after its construction, as well, to dictate 
permissible uses for that ostensibly public property. 
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Scholars have credibly linked issues of space, modernity, power, and the 
urban discourse.145 According to Katharine Kia Tehranian, “[z]oning laws, urban 
parks, city boulevards, urban transportation systems, and the telecommunication 
networks came into being not only to ease the functioning of modern cities but also to 
facilitate social control.”146 Whenever people struggle over the permissible uses of 
space—especially public space—power and politics come into play.  
Why is it important to discuss the meaning of space? Political scientist 
Margaret E. Farrar argues that “looking at the built environment allows us to be more 
specific about the ways in which discursive spaces and built spaces shape and mold 
specific subjectivities. Identities (both individual and group identities) are forged . . . 
within specific spatial arrangements.”147 In other words, sometimes a curb, a street, or 
a sidewalk represent boundaries that help define a person’s identity. Urban space is 
full of boundaries defining people’s identities. While suburban space arguably defines 
its inhabitants’ identities by a lack of infrastructure working as boundaries, suburbia 
is, in itself, an identity as well as a discursive space. The very word “suburban” can 
connote images of children riding bicycles and tricycles on neat sidewalks while their 
parents wash their cars in the driveways, trade recipes, and tend their gardens. Most 
of the action in a television show like “Leave It To Beaver” could not have occurred 
in downtown Cleveland. Urban boundaries, such as streets and sidewalks, can define 
power relationships. People order, politicize, and dispute urban spaces. Whether it is a 
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debate about paving a street, fixing a sewer system, or what to do with homeless 
people and panhandlers, the arguments about the built environment invariably 
represent a struggle about power. This is true whether one considers the downtown of 
a large city, or the main street of a suburban town. 
 Fitzpatrick and La Gory describe humans as spatial, territorial animals, and 
demonstrate how an urban environment’s physical features can reduce the cohesion 
necessary to a feeling that one inhabits a secure territory. Certain features in the built 
environment actually make it less secure for inner city residents. Elements like high 
vacancy rates in “high-rise, anonymous” apartment buildings and empty spaces that 
no one monitors translate into a disconnected feeling for people who must live in 
those places. Other alienating characteristics include an “absence of manageable 
territories promoting territorial identity (such as front or back yards, gardens, or 
courtyards); proximity to dangerous sites; high vehicular traffic; and unattractive 
architecture that symbolically stigmatizes residents.”148 This type of environment 
unfortunately exists in many modern American cities. It discourages territorial 
functioning among the people who live in it, meaning for example that the residents 
are less likely to defend their surroundings from the incursions of criminals or even to 
pick up litter. There is no cohesive community to defend; the built environment 
practically ensures it. The residents of such areas are also less likely to enjoy good 
physical and mental health. Locations like this discourage healthy social 
environments.149  
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Fitzpatrick and La Gory further show that the segregation of urban space 
(“retail restructuring”) adversely affects human behavior and contributes to the 
disruption of a city’s diversity, vital subcultures, and sense of community identity.150 
Urban planners and city boosters engage in a type of social segregation when they 
introduce malls, sports venues, and entertainment hubs into the center of a city. 
Seeking to attract people with disposable incomes who will spend time and money 
downtown even when they are not at work, city officials must sanitize the urban 
environment and rid it of unhealthy, undesirable people. In other words, they must 
regulate behavior. Homelessness is not compatible with the retail aesthetic. So even 
though city streets already contain built-in spatial barriers such as walls of buildings 
and curbs, city administrators sometimes find it necessary to erect legal and cultural 
barriers to define an ideal community identity. City councils and executives enact 
laws that redefine and restrict public space, and infrastructure once again becomes an 
agent of social control. Ordinances such as those passed by the Indianapolis Common 
Council in 1915, 1916, 1919, and 1925 demonstrate that city leaders sought to cleanse 
the urban streets and control how people used the urban environment well before the 
days of downtown malls, convention centers, and large sports venues.  
 What is public space, and what is private space? Is the sidewalk public? The 
street? The answers are not as obvious as they seem. Mona Domosh, a geographer, 
posits that public space, and transgressions thereof, are very context-dependent, and 
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can be quite subtle.151 In Brave New Neighborhoods: The Privatization of Public 
Space, Margaret Kohn proposes a definition of public space that incorporates three 
facets: ownership, accessibility, and intersubjectivity.152 “In everyday speech a public 
space usually refers to a place that is owned by the government, accessible to 
everyone without restriction, and/or fosters communication and interaction. This 
definition,” she argues, “reflects the widely shared intuition that public spaces are the 
places that facilitate unplanned contacts between people. These unplanned contacts 
include interactions between strangers as well as chance meetings between friends 
and acquaintances.”153 In other words, these unplanned, chance encounters are part of 
the “seething exchange” that helps make the street a borderland. Kohn examines the 
practices of the city governments of New York and Los Angeles vis-à-vis the 
homeless population to conclude that some sidewalks are more public than others. 
This conclusion would come as no surprise to Domosh, who examines the social 
codes and mores of New York in the nineteenth century—except that the codes of 
twentieth-century Gotham are explicit, legal, and written. Domosh writes of the 
unwritten rules governing the sidewalks of fin de siècle New York: “it is difficult to 
suggest that these spaces contributed to a completely democratic public sphere, where 
people were free to express themselves.”154 Put another way, the sidewalks of New 
York never were public in the way that Kohn defines the term. The sidewalks were 
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not accessible to everyone all of the time, and private interests controlled behavior 
there—they were not conducive to spontaneity.155  
Imbalances in the allowable use of American public space date back at least 
one hundred years. People have been seeking to regulate other people’s access to and 
activity in certain areas for generations, and the homeless population is particularly 
vulnerable to regulation. As proof of New York’s attempts to segregate the homeless, 
Kohn cites the evolution of Times Square from red-light district to a family-friendly 
tourist area, the closing of the city’s public toilets, and the city’s aggressive campaign 
to prohibit panhandling as proof of the blurring of the boundaries between public and 
private.156 As for Los Angeles, Kohn recounts Mike Davis’s work in City of Quartz, 
where he details that city’s practice of isolating the homeless and other “street 
people” in a Skid Row.157 These examples illustrate that retail restructuring and social 
sanitation render some sidewalks, curbs, and streets more public than others. 
The members of the Indianapolis Common Council in the years from 1890 to 
1930, and their counterparts in more recent times and in other cities, have tried to 
virtually sanitize the street by removing problematic people, behaviors, and messages. 
The members of the Common Council and the mayor also tried to literally sanitize the 
streets of Indianapolis—a more benign occupation in terms of individual rights and 
freedoms—by acting to organize the collection and disposal of garbage. 
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Chapter Five: Garbage and Health 
During the late nineteenth century, only a few municipalities offered their 
residents any type of garbage collection and disposal services, even though the 
American Medical Association’s Committee on Public Hygiene issued a report 
recommending daily street cleanings as early as 1849.158 Until about 1860, most U. S. 
cities employed human scavenger teams and pigs to provide garbage collection 
services.159 Although municipalities phased out the use of swine around the time of 
the Civil War, “[m]ost cities still continued in 1890 to rely on licensed scavengers or 
a single contractor” for street cleaning and garbage removal.160 The scavengers’ 
tenure would prove to be short-lived due to the pavement revolution in the coming 
decades.161 
It would not be until the turn of the twentieth century that cities, pressured by 
the (mostly female) “municipal housekeepers” of the Progressive Era, began to accept 
full responsibility for comprehensive waste management.162 Today, the word 
“garbage” is a generic term for all kinds of waste. But in the 1890s and into the early 
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twentieth century, the words “garbage,” “ashes,” “rubbish,” and “refuse” had very 
specific meanings in the sanitation business. “Refuse” was a collective noun that 
included all of the other sub-types of waste listed above. “Garbage” was defined as 
“the animal and vegetable waste matter originating in houses, kitchens, restaurants, 
and hotels, and include[d] the natural content of moisture and generally, also, the tin 
cans in which the portions of the food were originally supplied. It [wa]s chiefly food 
waste, and consist[ed] almost entirely of organic matter and water.”163 Significantly 
for many cities, garbage had a commercial value because it contained animal and 
plant foods and grease. “House ashes” were defined as “the residue from coal and 
wood fires in dwelling houses, schools, churches, stores, and small business 
establishments, but may [have] also include[d] small quantities of other inorganic 
materials, such as glass, crockery, metallic substances, bricks, earth, and dust.”164 
“Steam ashes” came from fires under large boilers and were usually commercial in 
origin.165 Finally, “rubbish” consisted of “miscellaneous materials from houses and 
stores . . . wood, paper, rags, bedding, excelsior, straw, leather, rubber, old furniture, 
stoneware, glass, boxes, barrels, etc., and sweepings from buildings.”166 It is 
important to keep this nomenclature in mind when reading contemporary discussions 
of what to do with “garbage,” because generally city officials were referring to 
something very specific when they used that term. 
In the 1890s, the city of Indianapolis took a number of different approaches to 
the issue of sanitation, none of them comprehensive or very sophisticated. In 1891, 
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the Common Council’s Committee on Public Health considered a petition to establish 
a dumping ground for “ashes, street scrapings, and other dirt, not including garbage” 
north of Fall Creek between Meridian and Illinois streets.167 On 1 February 1892, 
Mayor Thomas L. Sullivan addressed the gentlemen of the Common Council about 
the state of the city. He called the question of what to do with the city’s garbage “a 
perplexing subject for consideration. The present method of burying it in trenches and 
covering it with earth is unsatisfactory, and in time may be injurious to public 
health.”168 The members of the council acted only when enough of them agreed first 
that there was a problem, and second that an ordinance was the best method of fixing 
that problem. Instead of passing an omnibus ordinance dealing with garbage, the men 
on the council merely passed a law prohibiting the “throwing of trash upon freezing 
ice-ponds in the City of Indianapolis” in December of 1892.169  
The next year, in March of 1893, the council enacted a law prohibiting the 
“placing, depositing, or accumulation of manure within 20 feet from a dwelling, 
unless it occurred within the walls of a stable.”170 In February of that year, the Board 
of Public Works had introduced General Ordinance 5,1893, that was a very 
comprehensive piece of legislation regulating the disposal all manners of refuse—
kitchen garbage, night soil, ashes, dead animals, and offal—but the matter was 
referred to the Committee on Public Health and never mentioned again in the journal 
of the council’s proceedings for that year.171 
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Unlike Indianapolis, some cities did engage in comprehensive waste 
management practices during this period. The most evolved practices could be found 
in New York City, where Colonel George E. Waring, Jr., had encountered so much 
success that he published a book on the subject in 1897: Street-Cleaning and the 
Disposal of a City’s Wastes: Methods and Results and the Effect Upon Public Health, 
Public Morals, and Municipal Prosperity.172 As his title indicates, for Waring there 
was a direct link between the state of a city’s waste management practices and its 
fiscal strength, along with the health and morality of its citizenry. As street-cleaning 
commissioner, Waring dramatically transformed New York City’s urban environment 
from one of filth to one of cleanliness during his three-year term in the mid-1890s.173 
Waring began his book by describing the messy conditions of New York streets and 
of New York politics in 1893, prior to his term. He blamed politics for the state of the 
streets, because it was impossible for the street commissioner to hire and fire the 
necessary personnel, since the political machine gave those jobs as “rewards” and the 
commissioner could not fire unproductive workers.174 Once the new mayor appointed 
Waring in 1894, he quickly addressed issues of employee discipline and labor 
relations. He set up a system for arbitration of disputes and even included sample 
memoranda in his book so that other cities’ commissioners could duplicate his 
personnel system. 
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Waring included some fascinating statistics in his book: during his tenure, the 
city had “four hundred and thirty-three miles of paved streets (which alone receive 
our attention); and we have actually at work at this writing, about fourteen hundred 
and fifty sweepers—broom men, this gives a little less than one third of a mile, on an 
average, to each sweeper.”175 Each sweeper wore a uniform and had his own cart 
equipped with necessary supplies. Waring stated that  
ordinary streets are swept twice a day, and others 
from three to five times, according to the exigencies 
of the case. At present the work is divided about as 
follows: 68 ½ miles are swept once a day; 283 ½ 
. . . twice a day; 50 ½ . . . three times a day; 35 ½ 
. . . four or more times a day. This makes a total 
average sweeping of 924. This is not perfunctory work. 
The streets are really clean, and except for the littering, 
which the police have not yet succeeded in preventing, 
they always look clean. Mud is unknown, and dust is 
vastly diminished, in comparison with former conditions.176 
 
He pointed out that 32 percent of his budget went toward carting away “all domestic 
and some trade wastes, such as ashes, garbage, paper, and rubbish.”177 One-fourth of 
his labor force worked in this area, including some 600 drivers with horses and carts. 
Waring’s incredibly detailed book even described the collection schedules for the 
different zones of the city and the means of collection of each type of garbage. As for 
the disposition of the garbage once Waring’s men collected it, his department cooked 
and sold the grease it collected—apparently, this was a common practice in most 
cities in the mid-1890s.178 The ashes and street-sweepings were either used as landfill 
or dumped at sea as of 1897, but Waring foresaw a time when things were “soon to be 
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radically changed.”179 The ashes and street-sweepings were to be taken to Riker’s 
Island and used to construct a kind of seawall. The members of Waring’s crew sorted 
the paper and rags they collected, and then sold them. The average sales per week 
during a two-month period “were as follows: paper, $128.40; rags, $89.37; other 
materials, $43.47; Total, $261.24. This is for the collection of ten carts of the one 
hundred and fifty in use. It is only a general indication. The outlook is that the returns 
will increase.”180 As for other types of garbage, Waring’s men burned it and used the 
steam. For snow removal, the city hired contractors who collected the snow and then 
dumped it into a river.181 They also tried using snow-melting machines.182 
 Waring even enlisted the youth of New York City in his mission. He formed 
children’s leagues, and wrote of how such leagues would instill civic pride in his 
young charges. His department gave the children small cards to carry identifying 
them as volunteers with the street department, and Waring’s workers taught the 
children songs such as “And We Will Keep Right On” and “Neighbor Mine,” along 
with a “civic pledge” not to litter. Each child who belonged to a league—and each 
member of Waring’s department—learned and repeated the pledge: 
We who are soon to be citizens of New York, the largest 
city on the American continent, desire to have her possess 
a name which is above all reproach. And we therefore agree 
to keep from littering her streets and as far as possible 
to prevent others from doing the same, in order that our 
city may be as clean as she is great and as pure as she is free.183 
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Waring was able to inspire his workers, and even some of the youth of his city, to 
work very hard to sanitize their environment. Indianapolis did not have such a vital, 
charismatic, determined figure at the helm of its garbage collection and street 
cleaning efforts. 
 Nevertheless, the city did pick up garbage. In 1913, the city’s population was 
233,650. The city reported in that year to the Civil Service Commission of Chicago 
that its refuse collectors did not wear uniforms and did not separate refuse. Further, 
rubbish and ashes were collected by contract and hauled with wagons; a contractor 
collected the garbage, hauled it with wagons (wood tank style with a wooden cover), 
and fed the garbage to hogs.184 The city of Indianapolis had been contracting out 
garbage collection services since at least 1911.185 In 1916 the population of 
Indianapolis was 271,758, and the city collected 23, 267 tons of garbage that year, or 
171 pounds per capita.186 In 1917, the city collected 19,929 tons, or about 147 pounds 
per capita.187 The reason for the decrease of 14.4 percent was World War I—people 
were conserving more. For a time, instead of following New York’s example and 
having municipal employees do the work, the city contracted with a private business 
for the removal and hauling away of garbage, slops, and waste matter. In fact, in 1918 
the Common Council passed an ordinance making it a crime punishable by up to 
thirty days in jail and a one hundred dollar per day fine for any other person to 
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“engage in or conduct such business.”188 From 26 May 1918 to 31 December 1918, 
the city reduced 12,187 tons of garbage at a total cost per ton of $3.548; its revenue 
was $7.174 per ton, and its net profit was $3.626 per ton.189 In the late twentieth 
century, the practice of contracting out garbage removal and collection would be 
known as privatization and considered innovative. In 1918 in Indianapolis, it was 
short-lived. Soon, the city would assume responsibility for not only the reduction of 
the garbage, but also its removal and collection. 
The very next year, General Ordinance 8,1919 gave responsibility for the 
collection and removal of garbage to the Board of Public Works, which was 
mandated to dispose of the same at the “Reduction Plant, situate[d] on what is known 
as Sellers Farm, Marion County, Indiana.”190 Sellers Farm was located on the 
southwest side of the city just inside the city limits, along with the city dog pound and 
next to the site of the forthcoming sanitation (sewage treatment) plant, on the west 
side of Harding Street between Raymond Street to the north and Troy Avenue to the 
south. Appendix 2 shows the location of Sellers Farm in 1929. Today, the sewage 
treatment plant and other Department of Public Works facilities take up the entire 
area depicted in Appendix 2 between Harding Street on the east, Eagle Creek on the 
west, and White River to the south and east.191 There was a residential area directly to 
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the north of the area, just on the other side of Raymond Street near the intersections 
of Raymond Street, Belmont Street, and Kentucky Avenue. This proximity of homes 
to waste collection and disposal facilities was a prime reason why, in 1921, the 
Common Council would have to write the grandfather clause into its zoning 
ordinance. The city’s garbage plant was very busy indeed by the time the government 
enacted the zoning laws. The city transported 16,587 tons of garbage by railroad to 
the reduction plant in 1919 alone, at a cost of 0.26 per ton.192 
The city of Indianapolis used the Chamberlain process for reducing its 
garbage. It was a “liquid separating process,” invented by Mr. M.H. Chamberlain and 
first used in Detroit in 1898.193 The marketable byproducts of the reduction process 
were grease and fertilizer. The Chamberlain process used a  
special digester, the bottom of which [wa]s provided 
with three concentric circular cylinders having double  
walls, which [we]re closed at the top and open at the  
bottom. The sides of the cylinders [we]re perforated. 
After the cooking period, steam at high pressure  
enter[ed] the digester so as to force the cylinders up 
and drive out the liquids carrying the grease. The water 
and grease which ha[d] been processed out [we]re  
separated by gravity, and the solid matter [wa]s 
dried and otherwise prepared for market.194 
 
Cincinnati and Washington also used the Chamberlain method. 
 A centralized authority for garbage collection and disposal did not completely 
solve the city’s sanitation problems, however; Indianapolis also had a litter problem. 
The city lacked uniformed crews with carts like those of Colonel Waring’s in New 
York. So, in 1924, the Common Council passed ordinances placing at least 300 
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“waste-paper boxes” and fifty “sanitary litter cans” in the area bounded by 16th Street 
on the north, McCarty Street on the south, White River on the west, and State Street 
on the east.195 Although a private contractor handled the sanitary litter cans and the 
proceeds went to Riley Hospital, the city was still chiefly responsible for garbage 
collection and disposal. Some thirty years after Waring took over in New York City, 
the officials in Indianapolis were starting to emulate some of his practices, especially 
with respect to efficiency. An article appearing in the August, 1926 edition of The 
American City Magazine provides a snapshot of the garbage collection situation in 
Indianapolis: 
Russell T. MacFall, Vice-President, Board of Sanitary 
Commissioners, Sanitary District of Indianapolis,  
states that collection of garbage, ashes and rubbish 
is made by the Board of Sanitary Commissioners and 
not by private collectors. The city owns a fleet of  
reversible side-dumping trailers, hauling 4 tons of  
garbage each. These are loaded in the streets and alleys, 
are horse-drawn, and attended by one man, usually the 
owner of the team. When loaded, the trailers are  
assembled at a common rendezvous, made up into trains 
of four and hauled by tractor-truck to the reduction plant, 
an average haul of five miles. Ashes are collected in the 
same way, except that the driver and helper load the trailers, 
which are assembled and made up into trains and hauled 
to the dumps, with an average haul of about two miles.  
The average cost of collecting and hauling garbage for  
1925 was $3.015 a ton. The cost of collecting ashes 
for 1925 was $0.665 per yard, and of collecting  
market-house refuse $0.442 per yard. Last year a 
little over 25,000 tons of garbage was collected  
and disposed of, with a net profit of $21,000 to  
the reduction plant.196 
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During the period from 1890 to 1930, then, it is possible to see a distinct evolution in 
the attitude of city officials toward the issue of garbage. The businesslike tone of the 
detailed data that Mr. MacFall provided to the researchers at The American City 
Magazine in 1926 was a far cry from Mayor Sullivan’s hand-wringing before the 
Common Council about the “perplexing” problem of garbage in 1892.  Perhaps the 
city leaders were mindful of a connection between public health and sanitation. 
 The city of Indianapolis had its share of public health problems between 1890 
and 1930. During Mayor Thomas L. Sullivan’s February, 1892 speech to the 
Common Council, he reported the following statistics from the Commissioners of 
Public Health and Charities: in 1891, they had issued orders condemning “1,681 privy 
vaults; 43 wells; [and] 3,370 sewer connections.”197 The commissioners (or their staff 
members) had also placed 2,127 contagious disease placards in 1891. As of February 
1892, they had disinfected 287 dwelling since 1 November 1891. Finally, the mayor 
reported that the Public Health Commissioners had reported 2,244 cases of 
contagious diseases to the Superintendent of Public Schools (the public health 
officials made daily reports to the schools concerning disease), “giving name and 
residence of all persons having contagious disease, so that children from infected 
houses could be kept from school.”198 In addition to closing unsanitary privy vaults 
and unauthorized sewers in order to try to prevent disease, city officials also had to 
deal with containing disease once it occurred, hence the disinfection of houses and the 
reports to the school system.  
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 In fact, in the 1890s when Mayor Sullivan was speaking, many cities had to 
regularly deal with and manage communicable diseases that are now fortunately rare 
in the United States. One such disease was typhoid fever, which was a waterborne 
illness caused by the bacterium Salmonella Typhi.199 Pavement, curbs, zoning 
regulations, even sewers—infrastructure alone could not stop the spread of this germ. 
In the early twentieth century, a former resident of Indianapolis working for the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture discovered a way of killing the typhoid bacterium by 
purifying water: 
In a bulletin issued this week by the Department 
of Agriculture, formally announcing the discovery 
of a solution of copper sulphate which will remove 
from large reservoirs and bodies of water all  
impurities, including the typhoid germ, Dr.  
George T. Moore, formerly of Indianapolis,  
has been brought into public as well as scientific 
prominence as the discoverer of this remarkable process.200  
 
An article in the Indianapolis Journal dated 11 May 1904 proudly noted Dr. Moore’s 
Hoosier provenance (he was a graduate of Shortridge High School and Wabash 
College, and his mother still lived in the 1000 block of Capitol Avenue). Dr. Moore’s 
method of purifying the water was a forerunner of the current method municipalities 
use to treat drinking water, which is chlorination. The fact that this article about Dr. 
Moore’s achievement was a front-page, above-the-fold story in 1904 might be 
attributed partly to his status as a native son, and partly to the fact that water was still 
not potable in 1904. Typhoid fever was a legitimate threat to public health—it was 
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transmitted not only from interpersonal contact, but also through water contaminated 
with sewage. At this time, the sewers of Indianapolis led to the rivers—the same 
rivers from which the city drew its water supply. The city was in dire need of a 
sewage treatment plant, a fact recognized for decades by city leaders. It would be 
some twenty years before a wastewater disposal plant opened, however. 
 In addition to communicable diseases, Indianapolis had other health problems 
that were related to sanitation during the years 1890 to 1930. In December of 1920, 
the Common Council unanimously approved Appropriations Ordinance 21,1920 
authorizing a bounty on rats of five cents each.201 The total amount allocated was 
$1,000.00.202 The fact that the council passed this ordinance signaled that government 
efforts alone were not succeeding in controlling the city’s vermin problem.  
 While it is true that some of the public health and sanitation issues affected 
everyone who lived or worked within the city’s limits, the fact was that wealthier 
people could afford to live some distances from where they worked. In contrast, poor 
and working-class laborers needed to live within walking distances of their 
workplaces. In this way, the city’s health and sanitation woes had a disproportionately 
adverse impact on the poor. The city’s sanitary infrastructure separated people 
according to the health of their neighborhoods.  
 Merely living during these years was an assault on a person’s immune system 
and also on the environment. Although the residents of Indianapolis weathered 
impure water, rat infestations, and the influenza epidemic of 1918, it would be the 
failure on the part of city officials to design and build adequate infrastructure for 
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sewerage and sewage treatment that would have the most long-term consequences. 
The decisions that the city leaders made between 1890 and 1930 vis-à-vis these 
facilities, combined with the late arrival of zoning, have had a lasting impact on local 
residents, separating the city into healthy and unhealthy areas and livable and 
unlivable spaces.  
 84 
Part Two: Under the Street and In the Air 
 City planners and engineers faced congestion problems both on the street and 
under the street in the midst of the paving and infrastructure revolutions. A typical 
improved street in the center city of any large U.S. city in the 1910s had to 
accommodate the following underneath it: sewers, water pipes, gas pipes, “telegraph 
and telephone conduits, pneumatic tubes, pipes for the conveyance of steam, hot 
water or refrigerating compounds, [and] vaults and tunnels . . .”203 If the city had 
elevated railroads, the street also needed room underneath it for foundations, and if 
the city had a subway, even more width was needed down below. 
The decisions that the leaders of Indianapolis made with respect to the 
subterranean infrastructure of sewerage and sewage treatment still resonate in the 
early twenty-first century. These crucial choices, made in the context of a very late 
arrival to zoning, city planning, and wastewater treatment, helped cement the 
southwest side’s status as both the city’s garbage can and its bathroom. The choices 
that city leaders made between 1890 and 1930 have had long-term health 
implications. Certain places in Indianapolis are tolerable for working in, but not for 
living in. Yet, thanks to the factors discussed herein—politics, geography, a belated 
arrival to zoning and planning—people continue to live in those spaces. 
 Traveling northbound today on Harding Street from Interstate 465 to where it 
dead-ends at Oliver very close to the city center, one first notices the huge 
smokestacks belonging to the Indianapolis Power and Light (IPL) Harding Street 
Plant belching large quantities of thick white smoke into the air. The houses across 
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the street from the IPL plant are clean and modest, with an occasional Confederate 
“stars and bars” flag in the front window instead of drapes. Next comes Troy Avenue; 
just across Troy is the city’s animal shelter, and then after the pound is the Belmont 
Street Advanced Wastewater Treatment Plant. The current sewage treatment facility 
is in its original location, on the property once known as Sellers Farm. It is impossible 
to drive very far onto the campus of the treatment plant; in order to secure the facility, 
a massive, guarded gate blocks the entrance. Also on the old Sellers Farm property is 
Covanta Energy, with its own busy smokestack, the byproduct of the incineration of 
the city’s garbage.  
Raymond Street greets the traveler next, and the hulking Lilly Tech Center, 
which stretches all the way to Kentucky Avenue and Morris Street on the east side of 
Harding. In 1921, the Tech Center’s campus was occupied by stockyards. On the west 
side of Harding, one sees assorted manufacturing, industrial, and commercial 
concerns—a truck equipment supplier, stacks of concrete pipes, a package liquor 
store. And houses, schools, at least one church—all to the west, and visible from the 
street, proving that people choose to live where they will, not because a city planner 
recommended it. Those buildings represent a dense community that was there well 
before the zoning regulations and the opening of the sewage treatment plant, and 
which sits just about a mile north of the incinerator and wastewater treatment facility. 
After Kentucky Avenue and Morris Street, one has a brief chance to hop onto 
Interstate 70 before Harding dead-ends at Oliver, in what is now a Mexican 
neighborhood with a busy carnicería that sits across from a massive GM plant. 
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 Why did the city officials decide to locate the wastewater treatment plant 
where they did? What was it about the southwest side of the city that made it such a 
likely candidate for the dumping of garbage, stray animals, and sewage since at least 
the 1910s? The answers point to a number of factors—part geography, part human 
nature, part politics. The history of Indianapolis’s infrastructure under the street is 
just as multi-faceted as that which occurred on the street. 
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Chapter Six: Sewerage 
 According to its design, a curb stops undesirable materials from mingling with 
that which is worthy of protection. A curb is a physical barrier, and its existence 
implies a need for separation. In most cases, curbs are located along streets, and they 
separate the street from an elevated walkway. In 1890, the need to separate oneself 
from the streets of nineteenth-century cities was very real. The dangers inherent in the 
streets of that century reflected the varying sophistication of peoples’ understanding 
of disease and transportation, and ranged from miasmas to microbes, from horses to 
automobiles. In this sense, infrastructure protected people from nature and danger, but 
that benign vocation functioned, ultimately, to separate people from each other. We 
have seen how paved streets can perform a sanitary function, but also work to inhibit 
community strength and identity. Streets are part of a necessary infrastructure relating 
not only to commerce and transportation (occurring on their surface), but also to what 
is underneath them: utilities and sewerage. Streets can signify deep divisions between 
healthy and unhealthy areas of cities, just as they function to keep that which is 
unhealthy (effluents) divided and underground. In the late nineteenth century, 
influential city dwellers demanded that their streets be clean—preferably paved—and 
free of effluents, or sewage. In this respect, streets, curbs, and sidewalks were 
essential agents of public health, since they were often the only barrier between the 
spaces where people lived and worked and the spaces where they emptied their 
chamber pots. 
 For most of the nineteenth century, Americans did not use sewers to handle 
human waste; instead, they used sewers to drain the streets and remove storm or 
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surface water.204 This was the state of affairs in the United States during the 
“presewer period,” which lasted from 1800 to 1880.205 Instead of using sewers, 
people stored human waste in privy vaults and cesspools, which public- or private-
sector scavengers then occasionally cleaned.206 Citizens’ demands for adequate 
sewerage systems grew with the industrialization of their cities.207 By the last two 
decades of the nineteenth century, newer homes in the cities began to feature 
bathrooms, and older homes were retrofitted with running water. Cities began to wage 
“vigorous campaigns” against backyard privies. 208 It is worth noting that the 
Common Council of Indianapolis did not outlaw privy vaults in the city until 1921. 
The language of General Ordinance 64,1921 outlawed privy vaults when “a 
connection with a public sewer is or becomes accessible,” and defined “accessible” as 
a sewer within 100 feet of the outside line of the lot. The ordinance also outlawed 
water closets unless they were of a certain type, or they were operated as septic 
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tanks.209 Relative to its peers, the city of Indianapolis ran very late in regulating its 
residents’ household sanitation practices.210 
 During the nineteenth century, epidemics of cholera, typhoid, and yellow 
fever occurred regularly. The U.S. endured cholera epidemics in 1832, 1849, and 
1866; outbreaks of yellow fever in southern states, where the mosquitoes carrying the 
disease were more abundant, appeared almost annually.211 After the Civil War, 
Americans began to understand that they could reduce outbreaks of disease by 
increasing their municipal sanitation practices. Fear of disease was responsible for the 
popularity of the late nineteenth century’s public health movement, “while the 
concurrent benefits of water for industrial use and fire protection assisted reformers in 
arguments with cost-conscious taxpayers.”212  
As for the etiology of these diseases, the physicians of the nineteenth century 
fell into three basic camps: miasmists (also known as “anti-contagionists”), 
contagionists, and limited contagionists.213 In the pre-Pasteurian era, bacteria were 
not thought to be the cause of disease. Instead, the miasmists believed in what was 
then known as the “filth theory” of disease causation first put forth by an English 
physician, Thomas Sydenham. 
To miasmists the problem of etiology was multifaceted: 
garbage and offal amassed in the streets . . . courts trapped 
foul air; faulty sewers and inadequate drainage systems  
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added to the filth . . . These environmental factors, when 
combined with the right atmospheric conditions,  
supposedly caused most epidemic diseases, including 
cholera, typhus, typhoid, and smallpox as well as a host 
of endemic afflictions, the most deadly of which was consumption. 214 
 
In other words, adherents to the miasma theory of causation believed that the foul 
odors themselves (which could be the putrefaction emitting from broken sewers or 
dirty streets) caused disease, not microbes. Contagionists, who would ultimately be 
proven correct by Pasteur, Lister, and others in the latter part of the century, believed 
that microbes or similar organisms caused disease. These physicians believed in the 
practice of quarantining sick individuals. Finally, the limited contagionists believed in 
both the miasma theory of causation and the microbial etiology.215 The miasmists 
constituted the majority of public health reformers prior to the Pasteurian revolution, 
and their theory of disease dominated the public discourse until the 1880s and 1890s. 
According to the miasmists, “[t]he proper response to disease . . . was environmental 
sanitation—civic cleanliness, proper drainage and sewerage, adequate ventilation of 
buildings and removal of refuse. Because these practices often provided relief from 
disease, they were accepted virtually without question.”216 Since the miasmists 
believed that filth was a major cause of disease, many cities embarked on huge 
sanitation campaigns during epidemics. Sanitation—washing—required water that 
was itself free from disease, and sanitarians believed that if the water was odorless 
and colorless, it was safe: thus the demand for reliable municipal water supplies. The 
construction of waterworks went hand-in-hand with cities’ investment in sewerage 
systems. 
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 Once a city decided to build a system of sewers, there were other important 
decisions to make regarding its design, especially whether it would use “combined” 
or “separate” technology. At that time, one of the nation’s leading experts on 
sanitation and sewerage was George E. Waring, Jr., of street-cleaning and waste 
management fame. Waring was a miasmist who believed that sewer gas was 
responsible for many major illnesses, yet ironically he acted as a consultant for 
several U.S. cities in the construction of their municipal sewerage systems. He touted 
skilled plumbers as a neighborhood’s best defense against noxious sewer gas that 
might escape from faulty lines.217 Waring advocated that cities build “separate” sewer 
systems, as opposed to “combined” designs. According to Joel Tarr, this was a 
“critical design decision” for cities.218 The combined system carried both household 
wastes and storm water in one large pipe, while the separate system technology 
provided two sets of pipes. The smaller of the two sets of pipes in the separate system 
(called a sanitary sewer) carried household wastes; the larger pipe carried storm water 
from streets, roofs, and yards. Tarr writes that in many cities, though, having a 
separate system merely meant that the city built a sanitary sewer (for household 
wastes) and “made no provision for underground removal of storm water.”219  
 The separate system was attractive to Waring because he believed that the 
separate sewers “provided for swifter removal of wastes from the household and the 
city. [Waring] argued that unless human feces were transported out of the household 
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in a ‘fresh condition,’ they would ‘undergo putrefaction and give off objectionable 
gases.’”220 Waring believed that those sewer gases were lethal, because they 
contained decomposing feces. Although Waring was off the mark medically and 
scientifically, there was in fact a big problem with the combined sewer system 
technology: overflow. Since rainfall amounts vary, it was too expensive for cities to 
build combined sewers large enough to handle the maximum possible volume of 
storm runoff.221 So, engineers built overflows for the combined system’s pipes, which 
automatically removed sewage from the pipes when it reached a predetermined 
volume and sent it into nearby waterways.  
Since this overflow consisted of storm water mixed 
with household sewage, it created both water pollution 
and nuisances in parts of rivers that were normally free 
of a high content of wastes. Since overflow drains were 
often close to water intake areas or heavily populated  
areas, a serious hazard could be created.222 
 
The city fathers in Indianapolis opted for a combined system that hooked up sanitary 
sewer lines to existing storm sewers, and the city has experienced severe overflow 
problems ever since. The yellow dots in Figure 7 represent the points at which the 
sewers of Indianapolis presently overflow into local waterways. 
The genesis of this ongoing problem is located in decisions the city leaders 
made in the 1890s. Some of the fault rests with elected officials who tried to 
accomplish the job as cheaply as possible, and therefore decided on both a combined 
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system and a piecemeal method of installation (as opposed to a comprehensive plan). 
Another reason for the problem is traceable to the zeitgeist of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, when hiring experts and placing complete trust in them was 
the standard modus operandi for municipalities seeking solutions to massive 
problems. Indianapolis, like most large cities, had a big wastewater management 
problem in the late nineteenth century. So, the leaders of the city turned to experts for 
help. 
 
 
Figure 7. Department of Public Works, City of Indianapolis, “Where Sewers Overflow,” Department 
of Public Works, 
http://www.indygov.org/eGov/City/DPW/Environment/CleanStream/Problems/Sewage/where.htm 
(accessed 27 January 2008). 
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 Presewer Indianapolis used a system of culverts and above-ground wooden 
gutters to drain effluents to the White River. The city built an incomplete sewer 
system in 1870, and did not operate a sewage disposal plant until 1925, when the 
Belmont Street facility opened on the southwest side. 223 In 1891, the Commercial 
Club of Indianapolis adopted a resolution appointing a “Sewerage Committee” to 
survey the city’s present system, to investigate options for the development of that 
system, and to scout for a talented engineer who could advise the city in this area.224 
According to the published report of the committee, as of 1891 the city had seventy 
sewers carrying both sewage and surface drainage directly to White River, Pleasant 
Run, Pogue’s Run, Fall Creek, and what is today the Indianapolis Water Company 
Canal. The committee found that “[m]any of the sewers are in a very bad condition. 
Several of them should be removed or new sewers take their places at once.”225 
Further, the committee discovered that “[t]here is not a stream or open water-course, 
including the canal, within the city limits, into which sewage, filth and cesspools are 
not drained. Drains that were designed for surface drainage only have had 
connections made to them by private property-holders and are now used as common 
sewers.”226 The committee’s report detailed the fact that every single (legitimate) 
sewer they studied was in “bad condition,” and prone to leakage. 
 After discussing the failings of the present system, which included an 
overflow problem, the committee members made eight recommendations concerning 
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the city’s sewerage system (including filtration), and even recommended hiring a 
municipal sanitation engineer to act as a consultant. The committee also provided two 
options for executing the necessary improvements: a public option, whereby the 
improvements would be made under the aegis of the city’s Board of Public Works, 
and a private option, whereby the Commercial Club would solicit subscriptions from 
property holders and other interested parties and contract the work out itself. 227 City 
administrators opted for a piecemeal approach to Indianapolis’s sanitary problems, 
though, and more than one hundred years later the city still has an overflow problem.  
 In his 1892 speech to the Common Council, Mayor Sullivan seconded the 
findings of the Commercial Club.  
No improvement is more needed in Indianapolis 
than an adequate system of sewerage. Up to this 
time we have had no system of sewerage at all,  
properly speaking. The Board of Public Works  
has, however, caused a topographical map of the 
city to be prepared, showing its elevation and  
drainage areas, and a large amount of work will 
be done in building sewers that will be adequate, 
both for to-day and also for the Indianapolis of the future.228 
 
Historian Jacob Piatt Dunn, writing about 1910, looked back on the previous 
century’s efforts and noted that the city first seriously dealt with the issue of 
underground sewers in 1869. Two nationally prominent experts, Moses Lane and 
Ellis S. (E.S.) Chesbrough, approved the 1870s design of the Indianapolis sewerage 
system. 229 Lane and Chesbrough were both extremely powerful men—Chesbrough 
had persuaded the city of Chicago to spend more than $10 million on its sewerage 
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program, and Lane worked as a consultant in several cities around the country.230 
According to historians Schultz and McShane, the “consultant role was a measure of 
engineers’ status and of their aloofness from the pendulum swings of partisan politics. 
Despite keen competition among urban centers, city engineers were so important as 
in-house experts that local politicians could not deny them the opportunity of advising 
hated rivals in other cities.”231 
Dunn’s assessment of the state of affairs in 1891 was that most of the existing 
sewerage was “serviceable but it was overtaxed, partly on account of extensions and 
partly on account of improvements . . .  ” In 1891, the city had 26.66 miles of 
sewerage (21.3 miles of brick, and 5.34 miles of pipe), varying from one to eight feet 
in interior diameter. 232 Dunn related that after the Commercial Club published its 
recommendations, the Indianapolis Board of Public Works hired a consultant, the 
noted sanitation expert Rudolph Hering, in 1892. Hering had previously worked with 
the cities of New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Washington, DC.233 Most 
municipal engineers and politicians agreed that hiring experts was advisable—Lane 
and Chesbrough were influential men in their time (the 1850s through 1870s) because 
of their specialized knowledge in the field of sanitation. Albert F. Noyes, a municipal 
engineer writing in 1894, was   
pleased to see that other municipal engineers have 
been quick to perceive the advantage derived by  
retaining the services of a consulting engineer,  
thereby obtaining more perfect results for the  
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municipality and increasing the confidence of  
the community in their good judgment. The confidence 
of the public in the engineer has increased, until to-day 
but few works of importance are inaugurated without 
first calling upon his services.234 
 
In the 1890s, the two most noteworthy American sanitation experts were 
George Waring and Rudolph Hering. Waring, as already discussed, was a strong 
advocate of separate sewer systems for stormwater and household wastes, albeit for 
scientifically unsound reasons. Had the Indianapolis Board of Public Works hired 
Waring after the Commercial Club issued its report, he undoubtedly would have 
recommended a separate system. But the Board hired Hering instead, and like most 
large U.S. cities, ended up with a combined system with a serious overflow problem, 
for Hering was an advocate of combined systems. Two experts, two strong opinions: 
this raging dispute affected many cities’ decisions. Hering’s approach was less 
expensive, and most municipalities—and their engineers—were convinced that his 
method was the best.235 Unlike Waring, Hering was a trained engineer; he was able to 
persuade the majority of municipal decision-makers that the combined system was 
just as sanitary as the separate system (if properly built), as well as more economical 
for large cities.236 He was very successful in his campaign. According to the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, there are 772 communities in the United States 
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with combined sewerage systems.237 Figure 8 illustrates the distribution of those 
systems throughout the United States. 
 
Figure 8. United States Environmental Protection Agency, “CSO Demographics,” United 
States Environmental Protection Agency,  
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/cso/demo.cfm?program_id=5 (accessed 27 January 2008). 
 
 
 Hering issued his report to the Board of Public Works on 14 June 1892.238 He 
divided the city into five drainage districts that used Fall Creek, Pogue’s Run, the 
canal, and Pleasant Run as their boundaries. Moses Lane’s plan of the 1870s had only 
used Pogue’s Run and the canal. According to Dunn, the “sewer work” from the date 
of Hering’s report to 1 January 1909 followed the lines Hering dictated, and resulted 
in the completion of 224.25 miles. Dunn reported that the first 26.66 miles (which 
had been constructed before 1891) had cost $726,157.73 to construct, but the total 
cost of sewers up to 1909 was just over $3 million.239  
The above demonstrates that just as the urban landscape above the street is 
subject to political discourse, so is the landscape below the street. What happened 
under the street in terms of a sewer system was just as vulnerable to the moods of 
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those in power as what happened on the street. Those without a political voice would 
become the clear losers in this venture. In those first years in the development of a 
system of sewerage, the city leaders of Indianapolis seem to have been chiefly 
motivated by thrift and expertise. In a sense, they found an expert who told them what 
they wanted to hear. There is no evidence that Hering or the city’s decision-makers 
consulted the people who lived in the neighborhoods that might be affected by 
Hering’s proposed system. The seeds of community separation were sown in this 
early period, because depending on a neighborhood’s location with respect to the 
geography of the city, some places would become healthier than others. If a person 
lived by White River, for example, he essentially lived by an open sewer. While there 
is scant evidence of political gamesmanship with respect to the decision to construct a 
combined sewer system, such evidence abounds when one considers the history 
surrounding the city’s approach toward wastewater. For although Hering’s claim 
about economy had proven to be legitimate—at least in the short run—there was a 
nagging problem: the city lacked a sewage treatment plant. All of those new sewers 
built in the 1890s and 1910s ultimately led to the same place—the White River. For 
all the advancements a sanitary sewer would bring in terms of public health, the 
system of sewerage was incomplete without a method of dealing with the wastewater. 
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Chapter Seven: The Sewage Treatment Plant 
The city kept building its sewers, and they kept discharging into the major 
waterways of Indianapolis—chiefly White River, Fall Creek, Pogue’s Run, and 
Pleasant Run. Because of both the location of White River in relation to the 
waterways and the fact that the city’s terrain sloped to the southwest, the final 
destination for all of the sewers’ contents was White River. In other words, even 
sewage dumped into Pogue’s Run, Pleasant Run, or Fall Creek would flow into White 
River eventually. The main sewers designed by Moses Lane as part of the 1870s 
system and approved by Chesbrough flowed southwest to the Kentucky Avenue area 
and discharged directly into White River. The public could not realize the full health 
benefit of the sewerage system as long as the city’s rivers and streams were 
themselves open sewers. If a family had enough money, they could live far away 
from the noxious waterways and afford the costs of commuting to work, shopping, 
and school. For those whose economic conditions forced them to live close to where 
they worked, however, there was less choice in the matter. So the decisions made by 
the city leaders about the location and development of infrastructure worked to 
separate people into certain and distinct neighborhoods according to their 
socioeconomic status and financial resources. Those who had less money were stuck 
living closer to the polluted rivers and streams.  
And residents swam in the water from those rivers and streams—a 1910 
article from the Indianapolis Star recounted the action at a Common Council meeting 
the night before concerning municipal bathhouses. The members of the council had 
passed an appropriations ordinance that allocated $300 for the maintenance of a 
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municipal bathhouse on Fall Creek near Capitol Avenue. 240 There was some debate 
about whether children should be allowed to use the facility free of charge. A 
councilman from the south side, Mr. Troy, objected to the location of the site on the 
north side and insisted that there were several places on the south side of the city 
where water from Pleasant Run could be used to supply a bathhouse.241 
Even though the city had a utility (the Indianapolis Water Company, chartered 
in 1881) that supplied its residents with filtered water from Fall Creek, the company 
could only do so much to cleanse the water when sewage was flowing into that 
stream on a constant basis.242 Additionally, the water company was not responsible at 
all for filtering water in the other waterways, like Pleasant Run, where people were 
bathing, swimming, and fishing. Nevertheless, the company’s filtration plant was a 
model of progress for other cities in the state of Indiana. At a conference in 1908 on 
the topic of pure water, attendees included a tour of the filtration plant in their 
agenda.243 
Dunn noted that as early as 1859, the Locomotive (a local newspaper) was the 
first to come forth with a suggestion for an underground sewerage system for the city. 
The staff of the paper floated two alternatives—one emptying into Pogue’s Run, and 
one into White River. The piece in the Locomotive declared that whichever method 
was cheaper was the best one for the city. Dunn cautioned his contemporary readers 
in 1910 to avoid feeling too superior to their shortsighted 1859 ancestors; after all, did 
not the city currently have a problem on its hands regarding the disposal of 
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wastewater? Dunn admonished his readers to “pause and reflect if our present sewer 
system is not one that will have to be abandoned, or so modified as to prevent the 
flow of sewage into White River. Is it not manifest that it can be but a short time until 
this making sewers of running streams must be wholly discontinued?”244 
 The State Board of Health had taken note of the situation in Indianapolis with 
respect to sanitation earlier than Dunn. In 1898, Dr. J.N. Hurty, the secretary of the 
Indiana State Board of Health, observed that “[i]t is actually criminal for Indianapolis 
to pour each day into White River [thousands of pounds] of pollution, which, if used 
on a farm would bring a good return.”245 The city kept discharging its sewage into the 
waterways, however, right on into the twentieth century, through at least the 1910s.  
 White River and Fall Creek were not the only streams suffering this indignity. 
Pogue’s Run, which came from the northeast and flowed through downtown 
Indianapolis before it joined White River, was so filthy and smelly that the city 
enclosed the downtown portion within a tunnel after the great flood of 1913. It took 
four years, from 1914 through 1918, for the city to build the tunnel, including 
connecting the combined sewer overflow valves to it. The tunnel still exists; it starts 
just northeast of where New York Street crosses under Interstate 65 east of College 
Avenue; at that location, Pogue’s Run submerges and becomes an underground creek. 
It emerges from its tunnel near Kentucky Avenue and McCarty Street. Today, the 
tunnel has two channels, is sixteen feet wide, and eighteen feet tall. Department of 
Public Works personnel walk its length four times every year to inspect it.246 
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 In 1915, the city underwent a federal inspection of its sanitation efforts.247 Dr. 
H.F. Smith from the U.S. Public Health Service and J.A. Craven from the Federal 
Public Health Department audited the city’s water supply, sewage disposal, milk 
supply, garbage disposal, and any other practices which might affect the public 
health. They were also interested in the extent to which the waterways were polluted. 
They visited all cities in the state with a population of 10,000 or more.248 At this time, 
however, Indianapolis’s sewage disposal “system” consisted of dumping the waste 
material directly into its waterways, despite the repeated efforts of city officials to 
obtain authorization from the state government to change the situation. 
 In his 1916 speech to the Indianapolis Common Council, Mayor Joseph E. 
Bell lamented the state of affairs with respect to sanitation: 
[t]he need of a sewage disposal plant is recognized 
by every citizen who has given thought to the subject. 
There is no reason why the city should continue to  
dump its filthy sewage into White River when there 
are now well-recognized methods of disposing of the 
sewage whereby the unsanitary condition produced 
from the casting of filthy sewage into the river can be 
entirely eliminated, and what is now a waste can be  
turned into a profitable industry in the manufacture 
of fertilizer.249 
 
Mayor Bell was echoing the observation of the State Board of Health’s Dr. Hurty 
some eighteen years earlier concerning the pollution of the river. If everyone knew 
there was a problem, why hadn’t the city’s leaders corrected it? How was it that 
                                                
247 “Federal Inspectors Study City’s Sanitary Conditions,” Indianapolis Star, 13 August 1915, p. 16, c. 
3. 
248 Ibid. 
249 Journal of the Common Council of the City of Indianapolis, Indiana From January 1, 1916, to 
December 31, 1916, 182. 
 104 
almost two decades had passed with no progress? Mayor Bell, a Democrat, had an 
answer in the next part of his speech to the council. 
Prior to the meeting of the last General Assembly City 
Engineer Jeup prepared a plan for sewage disposal, and 
a bill for the construction of a sewage disposal plant in 
the City of Indianapolis was presented to the General 
Assembly; but a narrow-minded Republican delegation 
of Representatives from Marion County thought it more 
important to play cheap politics by opposing and defeating 
this measure than they did to serve the people by favoring 
the passage thereof. If the Marion County Delegation in 
the last House of Representatives had supported this measure, 
Indianapolis would to-day have practically completed a modern 
sewage disposal plant, and the unsightly and unsanitry [sic]  
dumping of sewage into White River would be practically at 
an end. As the result of the opposition of the Marion County 
members of the House of Representatives the waters of  
White River are still polluted with the sewage of the City.250 
 
Mayor Bell would only have one more year to work to correct this problem. In early 
1918, a new mayor took over, Republican Charles W. Jewett.251 But before Mayor 
Bell left office, he issued a twenty-two page parting shot in the form of his Message 
of Honorable Joseph E. Bell, Mayor, to the Common Council Reviewing Work 
Accomplished During His Administration January, 1914 to January, 1918 Submitted 
to the Common Council of the City of Indianapolis, January 2, 1918. He was proud of 
his administration’s accomplishments with respect to infrastructure: “more streets 
have been improved, more sidewalks have been built and more sewers constructed 
under the four years of this administration than under any two previous 
administrations. Streets, sidewalks, and sewers built under this administration if laid 
out on one continuous line would extend a distance of 281 miles, more than the entire 
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length of the State of Indiana.”252 He ended his message with many recommendations 
for the future and included some observations about the sewage disposal plant: 
[i]t is to be regretted that the Legislature of 1915 did not pass 
the bill that was recommended by City Engineer Jeup for the 
establishment of a City Sewage Disposal Plant. If it had been 
done this plant would now be completed and Fall Creek and 
White River would be relieved from the vile sewage which is 
cast into them by the city sewers. At that time the plant could 
have been built for one-half what it will cost today. This bill  
in the Legislature was defeated because of the bitter opposition 
of a powerful influence in this city which sought in every way to 
interfere with and prevent any new improvement undertaken in 
my administration. But the people generally are the sufferers  
from this selfish opposition and the people in the end will be 
compelled to pay the added cost. Its selfish influence has cost  
the people of this city untold sums of money. The last General 
Assembly did enact a law recommended by the City Engineer 
providing for the building of a sewage disposal plant, but the  
financial conditions which now prevail make the matter of time 
when this great needed work can be done a very doubtful matter.253 
 
The bitter, almost wounded tone of Mayor Bell’s final speech is understandable when 
one considers its context. To be sure, he had every right to be frustrated with the fact 
that the legislature’s delay would result in a more expensive undertaking overall for 
the taxpayers. Mayor Bell’s observation that “the people” would suffer for the delay 
in addressing the environmental issues posed by the lack of a wastewater treatment 
facility was correct—and not just in a fiscal sense. The members of the Common 
Council of the 1890s could be faulted for their utter failure to plan for a sewage 
treatment plant at the same time they were committing to a massive and ongoing 
sewerage construction project. The city leaders during the early years of the twentieth 
century were blameworthy for not aggressively pushing the issue. But all that time, 
the residents of the city who happened to live by its major waterways paid the price 
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with their health. They were victimized by a system of experts, power brokers, and 
politicians that meshed politics with public health. Mayor Bell was also prescient 
about the extended timeline—the sewage treatment plant would not begin operation 
until the mid-1920s. Finally, it was legitimate to interpret the General Assembly’s 
timing in passing the bill during Bell’s last year in office (1917) as a personal swipe 
at the mayor.  But why was there such a personal animus between this Democratic 
city mayor and the Republican county officials?  
 One answer, no doubt, is that Mayor Bell’s election in 1914 was marred by a 
scandal of frightening proportions. In 1915, a Marion County grand jury indicted him 
first on 22 June for conspiracy to commit felonies, bribery, and blackmail and again 
on 3 July for “‘seeking by violence and threats of criminal prosecution to influence a 
voter.’”254 The original set of indictments in June accused 128 defendants and totaled 
forty-eight counts. Included among them were former (Democratic) Mayor Thomas 
Taggart, who was in 1915 the Democratic National Committeeman for Indiana; Chief 
of Police Samuel Perrott; Robert W. Metzger, a Republican member of the Board of 
Public Safety; Don M. Roberts, a former mayor of Terre Haute who was currently in 
the Federal Penitentiary for his role in a local election fraud case; and even members 
of the Progressive Party. Bell’s lone co-defendant in the July indictment was the chief 
of police. The indictments alleged that the conspiracy began with the May, 1914 
primary and ran through the November election of that year. The charges included 
“illegal voting, intimidation, false registration, padding the talley sheets, stuffing the 
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ballot boxes, illegal manipulation of voting machines, blackmailing of saloonkeepers 
and resort owners, bribes and vote-buying.” Seven of the defendants pled guilty at 
their arraignment in July of 1915; the vast majority of the other defendants, over 100 
of them, wanted trials.255  
 The mayor’s trial, which began in mid-September, was sensational. The 
prosecutor’s opening statement lasted eleven hours.256 In his opening statement, M.A. 
Ryan, Mayor Bell’s defense attorney, accused the state’s witnesses of perjury, and he 
accused the prosecutor’s agent of employing a “crook” to coach those witnesses up in 
Chicago and then secreting the witnesses at a camp in Ohio until it was time for them 
to testify. Mayor Bell was acquitted of the conspiracy charges on 13 October—the 
jury of six Republicans, three Democrats, a Socialist, a Progressive, and a 
Prohibitionist took less than two hours to deliberate and reach a verdict.257 The 
prosecutor, A.J. Rucker, ended up dismissing charges against 105 of the remaining 
118 defendants on 11 December of 1915, because “in view of the showing made in 
the trial of Mayor Joseph E. Bell on the conspiracy charges he did not believe the 
state had sufficient evidence to warrant going to trial with the 105 cases.”258 
Obviously, Mayor Bell’s jury had seriously questioned the credibility of the witnesses 
for the prosecution. So, when Bell referred in his 1918 speech to “a powerful 
influence in this city” that sought to undermine his efforts to modernize the city, he 
was not being unduly partisan or a sore loser. Unfortunately, an issue of public health 
had become a political football to be tossed around by partisan rivals. 
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 The Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Indiana General 
Assembly signed and ordered House Bill 312 enrolled on 5 March 1917.259 That 
important piece of legislation created for Indianapolis a Department of Public 
Sanitation under the control of a three-member Board of Sanitary Commissioners.260 
The law empowered the board to hire a consulting engineer to design a sewage 
disposal plant or plants and issue a report.261 The law also gave the board a process by 
which they could determine that a river or stream was being polluted by sewage, and 
the power to officially declare that the city needed a sewage disposal plant to 
maintain public health and welfare.262 This process included the right of remonstrance 
to people affected by the board’s decisions, as well as a right of appeal. As far as the 
location of the plant, the law allowed the board “[t]o condemn, appropriate, lease, 
rent, purchase and hold any real estate, rights of way, materials, or personal property 
within such city . . . or within five miles of the corporate limits thereof in any 
direction needed for a sewage disposal plant or plants and for intercepting or 
connecting sewers . . . .”263 The law did not mandate a specific location for the plant, 
and it even allowed for more than one facility. This was important, because although 
the city had been using the Sellers Farm location as its all-purpose dumping ground, 
the wording of the law actually empowered the board to explore possible sites for a 
treatment plant that were as much as five miles outside the city limits. Presumably, 
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those areas were less densely populated and it would have been relatively easy for the 
board to condemn or appropriate the land under its eminent domain authority.  
 In terms of paying for the plant, the enabling legislation authorized the Board 
of Sanitary Commissioners to get loans from the City Controller until the board could 
issue bonds and collect taxes. The law authorized a special tax for a sanitary district, 
and empowered the newly created Sanitary District to finance both the construction of 
the plant and the purchase of its property by issuing bonds until taxes could be 
collected.264 In authorizing the creation of the special sanitary district, the Indiana 
General Assembly was following a practice first popularized in the 1880s and 
1890s.265  Once again, as with zoning laws, the state of Indiana was a late adopter of 
innovation. Tarr observes that the  
special district government was another institutional  
development of this period with strong implications  
for the provision of infrastructure. These were state  
creations that had fiscal and administrative independence 
for special functions. Early special districts were primarily 
in the areas of water and sewerage . . . The motivation for 
their formation included the need for a functional structure 
independent of political boundaries, a desire to escape the 
existing municipal tax and debt limits, and a wish to be  
free of political control.266 
 
As Tarr mentions, the concept of districts managing certain functions was born out of 
a desire to keep important services affecting public health apart from the 
machinations of politicians. Unfortunately for the people and environment of 
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Indianapolis, that very factor—the machinations of politicians—prevented the 
creation of a sanitary district for years.  
The legislature’s choice of a district funding model was also important from a 
planning standpoint. Speaking at the Fifteenth National Conference on City Planning 
in Baltimore in 1923, George Ford stressed the importance of regional planning 
within the specific context of sanitation. “The more communities are grouped the 
more difficult it is for each separate municipality to provide its own water supply and 
sewerage and refuse disposal. Stream pollution becomes more and more of a menace. 
The only alternative is a co-operative development of common facilities . . . ” 267 Ford 
also addressed the question of where to locate the facilities by stating that the “choice 
of areas to be used for water supply, or sewerage or refuse disposal, obviously must 
be made regardless of the limits of the individual towns, if the problem is going to be 
solved in the interests of the whole area. Therefore, again regional planning and State 
or County control is necessary.”268 Ford emphasized that a government should locate 
crucial infrastructure in the optimal place, irrespective of the corporate limits of cities 
and towns. Indeed, the legislature gave the Indianapolis Board of Sanitary 
Commissioners five miles’ leeway in any direction for the plant’s location, and even 
used the word “plants” in the plural sense in case the board decided the city needed 
more than one facility. Given all this flexibility, why did the Board of Sanitary 
Commissioners settle on the Sellers Farm site? 
Appendices 1 and 2 provide one answer that has nothing to do with egos, 
corruption, or politics: geography. Sellers Farm happened to be situated right where 
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White River met Big Eagle Creek. In fact, Appendix 1 illustrates that all of the city’s 
four major waterways flow downstream toward that point: White River, Fall Creek, 
Pogue’s Run, and Pleasant Run Creek. The city’s topography slopes to the southwest, 
which explains why the waterways flow toward this point.269 Appendix 2 is a map of 
the area dated 1929 and indicates that the wastewater treatment plant was originally 
named the Eagle Woods Sanitation Plant. The garbage reduction plant was already 
located on the Sellers Farm site, White River converged with Big Eagle Creek at that 
point, and it was already within the city’s limits—those three factors could have been 
the most determinative in the board’s choice for the location of the sanitation plant. It 
is also possible that the city’s leaders took the easiest and cheapest route in the 
process of site selection. Perhaps they were suffering from inertia, having put so 
much energy into the passage of enabling legislation. Another factor may have been 
that the southwest side of the city was less densely populated than the southeast side 
at that time. Appendices 3 and 4 show the southwest and southeast sides of the city 
respectively in 1921. The thick, dark gray line represents the city limits. A visual 
comparison of the two halves of the map reveals the differing settlement patterns.  
Although the enabling legislation for the sanitation plant had passed in 1917, 
for some reason the fledgling Department of Sanitation was still borrowing money 
from the city two years later instead of issuing bonds to finance the project. On 19 
September 1919, the Common Council unanimously passed General Ordinance 
90,1919, which allowed the City Controller to make a temporary loan of $200,000 to 
the department “in anticipation of a sale of bonds by said department.” Little was 
offered as explanation about the reason for the delay in securing financing for this 
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important construction project. The council’s minutes do state that on 7 July 1919, the 
State Board of Tax Commissioners had considered the Sanitary District’s petition to 
issue bonds “or other indebtedness in the sum of four hundred thousand dollars, for 
the purpose of raising money to pay for the partial construction of a sewage disposal 
plant for said Sanitary District as authorized by law . . .” 270 The State Board of Tax 
Commissioners apparently was still considering the petition some two months later. 
Was it possible that politics had entered the picture yet again, despite the creation of a 
supposedly apolitical district for this infrastructure?  
Apparently so, for the next year the council was still considering requests for 
loans. General Ordinance 7,1920 authorized the City Controller to make another 
temporary loan to the Department of Public Sanitation, this time in the amount of 
$375,000, “in anticipation of a sale of bonds by said department and payable out of 
the proceeds of same, and fixing a time when the same shall take effect.”271 In 1919, 
the council had authorized the city to loan the Sanitation Department money which 
would be due in February, 1920. The department was without the cash to pay back 
those loans, so it needed another loan to maintain solvency. The council observed that 
“it was still impractical to issue bonds of said Sanitary District,” that the department 
had to pay off loans totaling $150,000, and that it needed $225,000 more “to carry on 
the work of construction of the Sewage Disposal Plant, to August 15, 1920.” General 
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Ordinance 7,1919 passed unanimously on 2 February 1920, and Mayor Charles W. 
Jewett signed it on 6 February 1920.272 
Just three months later, the council found itself again in a position to consider 
another loan to the Sanitation Department. On 17 May 1920, General Ordinance 
50,1920 was introduced and read for the first time. It authorized the City Controller to 
make yet another temporary loan to the Department of Sanitation, this time for 
$500,000, again “in anticipation of a sale of bonds . . .” This request accounted for 
$150,000 to pay a loan due 14 August 1920; $100,000 to “carry on the work of 
construction now underway;” and, “a further sum of two hundred fifty thousand 
dollars will be required from August 15, 1920, to the end of the year to carry on 
construction.” Again, the only justification given for the record was that it was “still 
impracticable to issue bonds of said Sanitary District.” 273 The council unanimously 
passed the ordinance on 14 June 1920, and Mayor Jewett signed it on 15 June.274 Still, 
the district was not issuing bonds. 
Someone in either the Department of Sanitation, or on the Common Council, 
or at the City Controller’s office had been too optimistic about the budget, because 
only three months later, the Board of Sanitation Commissioners was again before the 
council asking for a loan. On 7 August 1920, the council considered General 
Ordinance 72,1920, which authorized the City Controller to make one or more 
temporary loans in anticipation of revenues to be derived from the sale of Sanitary 
District bonds.275 Over a year had passed since the Sanitary Commissioners had 
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petitioned the State Board of Tax Commissioners for permission to issue bonds. The 
District was still not issuing bonds. According to the record of that meeting on 7 
August, the General Assembly had declared an emergency and passed a law allowing 
more loans totaling $200,000. The council suspended the rules, read the ordinance 
three times, voted and passed it unanimously on the same day it was introduced, and 
the mayor signed it—all on the same date.276 The minutes of the Common Council 
never mention the word “crisis” to describe this repeated need for funding, but the 
pattern raises questions. Perhaps the sewage treatment plant was just not a high 
priority for officials working at the state level. First the delay in passing enabling 
legislation, and then the delay in funding the plant’s construction: these circumstances 
suggest that the state, county, and city were not working together in a harmonious 
fashion. The funding problem may also be evidence of a lack of advocacy for the city 
on the part of its leaders.  
In 1921, the Common Council did act to clean up the city’s waterways by 
unanimously passing General Ordinance 61,1921, which prohibited “any waste or 
refuse matter whatsoever to be deposited in or to enter, directly or indirectly, into any 
stream or water course within the City of Indianapolis.”277 The ordinance also 
dictated that “no person, firm or corporation shall cause or permit the contents of any 
privy-vault, cesspool, septic tank or other device for the reception of [fecal] or other 
refuse matter to enter directly or indirectly into any stream or water course within the 
limits of the City of Indianapolis.”278 The law exempted substances that first passed 
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through a public sewer, presumably because of the combined system’s overflow 
problem under rainy conditions. The law also allowed a grace period of six months to 
let people and businesses reconfigure their plumbing in order to become compliant, 
and further outlawed the dumping or depositing of any “waste or refuse matter” 
within 500 feet of any “stream, water course, public parkway or park boulevard” 
without a permit. The only exception to the dumping law related to the “dumping or 
depositing of waste or refuse matter upon the property of the City of Indianapolis, 
commonly known and described as Sellers Farm.”279  
After all of the delays and setbacks, the city finally opened the sewage 
disposal plant in 1925.280 The once-beautiful pump house with its tan brick and dark 
green tiled roof, shown in Figure 9, is no longer operational, but its design reflects the 
pride people took in their public utilities during that era. Figure 10 depicts the pump 
house’s entrance, with its ornamental doorway and a bas-relief decoration above the 
door. 
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Figure 9. Pump House exterior, Belmont Advanced Wastewater Treatment Plant, 19 September 2007. 
Photograph by author. 
  
Figure 10. Pump House front view, Belmont Advanced Wastewater Treatment Plant, 19 September 
2007. Photograph by author. 
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The plant’s original Administration Building, depicted in Figure 11, is also still 
standing. It is now attached to a newer building, and the staff uses it for meetings and 
training sessions.  
 
Figure 11. Administration Building, Belmont Advanced Wastewater Treatment Plant, 19 September 
2007. Photograph by author. 
 
These structures, and the others that made up the sewage treatment plant that 
are no longer standing, represented a significant step forward for the city of 
Indianapolis in terms of the health of both its environment and of its residents. 
However, the plant could do nothing to address the overflow problem that was an 
inherent part of the combined system’s design. So, the city’s sewerage system was 
mixed news for its inhabitants—if a person lived far enough away from Fall Creek, 
Pleasant Run, Pogue’s Run, or White River, he might never notice the overflow. 
However, if a person lived near one of those waterways, she would be acutely aware 
of the design flaw every time it rained. And, if a person lived near the sewage 
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treatment plant, he might validly question why such a facility was built so close to 
populated areas, especially since there were zoning laws. In this way, the 
infrastructure of the sewerage system separated people within the city and marked 
their neighborhoods as either desirable or undesirable places to live. 
This result—mixed news and separation—occurs time and again in the city’s 
history with respect to the infrastructure put into place from 1890 to 1930. The battles 
surrounding the construction and location of a sewerage system and a wastewater 
treatment plant proved that even the most basic public health measures were subject 
to the moods of those in power and were the objects of contests. All of the rationality, 
health, and optimism inherent in the promise of a zoning and planning system never 
even came close to fruition where the sewerage, wastewater, and garbage disposal 
systems of Indianapolis were concerned. Instead, the city leaders ensured that the 
neighborhood around Sellers Farm would be a less healthy, less desirable place to live 
than anywhere else in Indianapolis. The heavy industrial development on the 
southwest side did not abate, but only grew. The adjacent homes remained, however, 
and the community still exists in the shadows of smokestacks. 
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Chapter Eight: Health and Pollution 
 The city’s combined sewer system can experience an overflow with as little as 
a quarter of an inch of rain. An Indianapolis Star article from 2003 described the 
situation this way: “after a rain, Ermal Vinnegar sometimes takes a whiff and thinks 
that all of it [raw sewage]—every last toilet flush—has been dumped in her front 
yard. ‘We just can’t stand it,’ said Vinnegar, who lives on Fall Creek and, because of 
that, has to keep the windows shut most of the summer. ‘It’s almost embarrassing to 
have company over when it smells like that.’”281 As of 2003, overflows occurred 
approximately sixty times a year and accounted for seven billion gallons of untreated 
waste.282 In 2005 the Indianapolis City-County Council approved a $435 million plan 
to overhaul the city’s sewerage system.283 Indianapolis has had two sewage treatment 
plants since the 1960s; the Southport Advanced Wastewater Treatment Plant opened 
on the south side in 1966 and was updated in the 1970s and 1990s. Currently, the 
Belmont Plant handles an average flow capacity of 120 million gallons a day, with 
peak flows of up to 300 million gallons a day. The Southport Plant handles an 
average daily flow of 125 million gallons, with a peak daily flow of 180 million 
gallons. The two plants together treat over 70 billion gallons of wastewater 
annually.284 As part of the work to fix the sewer system, the city is building a six and 
a half-mile long, twelve-foot diameter underground sewer connecting the two plants 
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called the “Belmont-Southport Interplant Connect.”285 Since the Belmont Plant 
currently handles two-thirds of the overall flow, connecting the two plants will allow 
the Southport Plant to receive a higher volume, especially when it rains. The city also 
plans to complete a deep tunnel between Fall Creek and White River by the year 
2025; that deep tunnel will deliver a volume of up to 150 million gallons a day to the 
Southport Plant via the Interplant Connect.286 
 Part of the overhaul to Indianapolis’s system includes collecting the overflow 
and storing it until the city’s plants have the capacity available to treat it. This method 
will be highly compatible with an approach to urban design and planning that takes 
into account the natural processes of the environment surrounding cities.287 As 
laudable as that development is, the unhealthy aspects of the street—in this case, 
sewage—still disproportionately affect the poor who live inside the city limits. That 
was the situation in the nineteenth century, it was true for the entire span of the 
twentieth century, and it is still the case in the nascent years of the twenty-first 
century.288 There is a relationship between income and health: “[o]ne of the best 
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predictors of the location of toxic waste dumps in the United States is the 
geographical concentration of people of low income and color.”289 According to 
sociologists Kevin Fitzpatrick and Mark La Gory, “socioeconomic conditions and 
race appear to be the major factors in determining exposure to multiple environmental 
hazards.”290  
 This rings true for Indianapolis. A recent publication by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency’s National Air Toxics Assessment states that the 
people who are at the greatest risk of developing cancer in Indiana live in the low-
income, heavily industrialized areas in Marion County (Indianapolis) and Lake 
County (Gary).291 In fact, “[a]n Indianapolis census tract southwest of downtown that 
lies between White River and Belmont Avenue had a risk of 274 in a million . . . .”292 
Although the sewage treatment plant cannot be solely responsible for this increased 
risk of illness, that facility has company on the southwest side: a power plant, a 
landfill, the city’s garbage incinerator, and heavy industry. It is fair to state that there 
may be a relationship between the homes’ proximity to these types of industrial 
neighbors and the reduced health of their residents. By comparison, a neighborhood 
on the east side of the city, between Morris and Raymond streets and just west of 
Emerson Avenue, had a cancer risk of 195 in a million.293 
In a manner reminiscent of the miasmists, residents of the area near the 
sewage treatment plant pointed to its odor as the problem. One southwest side 
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resident remarked to journalists: “[W]e’ve always had a problem with the sewage 
smell; it smells like something dead, don’t it?”294 Another person, who owned rental 
property in the same area, “blamed the smell on the city’s sewage treatment plant, 
which burns sludge, and Covanta Energy, the incinerator where most of Marion 
County’s trash is burned. ‘When they start cooking, as I call it, at the sanitation plant, 
you better hold your breath,’ [he said].”295 Appendix 5 is a contemporary aerial 
photograph of the neighborhoods to the north and west of the Belmont Plant (the 
plant’s location is marked by the label “IWDP”). This picture dramatically illustrates 
just how many people live near the plant and its industrial neighbors. An 
improvement to the urban infrastructure originally designed to separate humans from 
disease, Indianapolis’s sewerage system now separates humans from each other 
because what happens with infrastructure can distinguish people by health and 
disease. The healthier the neighborhood, the more affluent it is, and the farther away 
it is from toxic spaces, whether they are above ground or below. 
Historically, the city of Indianapolis has been no stranger to toxic 
environmental conditions. Writing in 1870, W.H. Churchman of Indianapolis 
declared that “[p]urity in the air we breathe is one of the prime necessities of life, and, 
therefore, an essential condition of physical and mental health.”296 While Churchman 
was primarily concerned with indoor air quality, his essay is noteworthy because its 
contents demonstrate that certain substances were known to be toxic and lethal if 
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airborne. For example, Churchman listed pollutants such as lead, copper, arsenic, and 
sulfur, as well as carbonic acid (now known as carbon dioxide), carbonic oxide (the 
archaic term for carbon monoxide), and carburetted hydrogen (the old term for 
methane).297 So, although people knew that certain substances did not belong in 
healthy air as early as 1870, the skies of Indianapolis in the years from 1890 to 1930 
were not at all clean. Figure 12, below, shows a smoky Indianapolis skyline circa 
1905. 
 
Figure 12. “Smoke at Grand Hotel, circa 1905” (Bass #4709), folder492_doc12.jpg, Box 75, 
Folder 1. Bass Photo Co. Collection, Indiana Historical Society. 
 
 The unhealthy quality of this air seems self-evident today. It is hard to 
imagine living and breathing healthfully in the environment pictured above, yet 
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whether smoke was actually a problem was a matter of debate. In 1906, the 
Indianapolis News ran an article on page one with the headline, “Smoky City Means 
Health and Wealth.”298 The city was trying to enforce its anti-smoke ordinance, which 
raised the ire of local coal producers and sellers to the point that they met with Mayor 
Bookwalter. At that meeting, they argued that the anti-smoke crusade was bad for 
business; it was “driving Indianapolis consumers to the use of West Virginia coal, 
was keeping new manufacturies [sic] from coming into Indiana, and diverting money 
from Indiana markets and the union labor of Indiana mines to outside markets and the 
‘scab’ labor of West Virginia.”299 Further, they pointed out to the mayor that a smoky 
city was a prosperous city (thus the headline), using the example of Terre Haute, 
which was then called the “Pittsburgh of the West.” That city’s population had 
increased an estimated 70 percent in the preceding five years.300 There was a 
dissenting viewpoint about the blessings of smoke, however; W.F.M. Goss of Purdue 
University spoke to an audience in Indianapolis in 1906 and outlined the costs of air 
pollution, which he called the “annual smoke bill of [the city].” 
This arises not from the loss of fuel or heat in the form 
of smoke, for that is so small as to be almost negligible, 
but in the damage which is wrought by its presence, upon 
the architectural embellishment of the city, upon the fixtures 
and furnishings of its homes, and upon the apparel of its 
citizens. Loss also occurs through the extensive use of  
artificial light which the presence of smoke enforces and  
because of its effect on the welfare of those from whom  
it shuts out the sunlight and takes away the purity of the 
atmosphere.301 
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Despite the lobbying of the coal interests, Indianapolis officials strove to 
enforce the city’s air quality laws. The name of Jacob P. Brown, the city’s smoke 
inspector, appeared frequently in the headlines between the years 1909 and 1911.  
After five months on the job, Brown was able to convince at least twenty-two 
offending businesses to take remedial measures, and had only resorted to arresting 
three individuals for noncompliance.302 Like other areas of health and safety, such as 
traffic and sewerage, the issue of air pollution became a political hot potato. In 1911, 
the new mayor, Samuel Lewis Shank, appointed a new nonpartisan Commission and 
Board of Safety and planned to establish a new “smoke department”—which would 
not automatically include Jacob Brown, the current inspector. Brown would have to 
pass a civil service test in order to stay on, possibly as assistant smoke inspector.303 
During the new administration, members of the city council debated whether a new 
ordinance was necessary, Brown kept his job (for the time being), and smoke kept 
pouring out of the city’s stacks.  
In 1912, most of the airborne coal soot within the Mile Square landed on the 
south side, due primarily to the location of Union Station, which was in the southwest 
quadrant of the central city.304 Though city officials knew air pollution in the form of 
smoke and soot was a problem, they did little to address that problem. An editorial in 
the Indianapolis News dated 8 January 1915 criticized the city’s inaction on the issue 
of smoke abatement and accused the smoke inspector of being more concerned with 
politics than with doing his job.305 The editorial writer even proposed that the city do 
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away with the smoke inspector’s position altogether in order to save his salary—
instead, the writer suggested that the members of the Chamber of Commerce agree  
“ among themselves to abate the smoke nuisance to the best of their ability” and 
predicted that the results would be “immediately manifest.”306 The city’s leaders did 
not follow that suggestion. Instead, they chose to adhere to their usual pattern of 
passing ordinances aimed at solving problems. The council passed another revised, 
supposedly toughest-yet smoke ordinance in October of 1923 after nearly a year of 
debate.307 There was little to distinguish this ordinance from its predecessors—it 
called for the employment of an inspector with regulatory powers, and it applied to 
almost every producer of smoke in the city except for gas cooking stoves and 
appliances for residential heating and cooking. The mayor (Lewis Shank, back for 
another term) promised strict enforcement of this ordinance, as had all previous 
mayors for all previous ordinances. Mayor Shank pledged that the city would not 
have a recurrence of the previous winter’s conditions, when “clouds of smoke hung 
over the city each day.”308 Despite these guarantees, the smoke abatement ordinance 
of 1923 was apparently just as ineffective as its forerunners.  
 In 1926, a study ranked Indianapolis as the sixth smokiest city in the country 
behind St. Louis, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Detroit, and Chicago.309 The study measured 
“smokiness” according to the amount of dust particles in a cubic foot of air. H.C. 
Murphy, the inventor of the measuring instrument, told a meeting of Indiana scientists 
that the inhabitants of the six smokiest U.S. cities who frequented their cities’ 
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downtowns “inhale[d] more than a teaspoonful of soot and dust a day.”310 The exact 
figure for 1926 was 14,300 particles of soot and dust per cubic foot.311 By 1930, the 
city had succeeded in reducing that figure all the way down to 6,170 particles on a 
recent “smokeless” day, earning the ranking of second-cleanest nationally behind 
Boston.312 Roy Johnson, the secretary and manager of the Indianapolis Smoke 
Abatement League, credited his organization’s campaign of education and 
cooperation for the dramatic reduction. The newspaper article touting the good news 
contained no mention of city ordinances or smoke inspectors. Instead, the article 
implied that the cultural attitudes of the business owners and coal producers had 
evolved. Johnson noted that “[t]he smoking chimney is no longer a badge of honor 
but is the mark of inefficiency, waste and civic indifference.”313 
 Even though the city greeted 1930 with some positive news on the air quality 
front, its air was still hardly clean. The view of downtown Indianapolis from White 
River depicted in Figure 13 is certainly very dirty, and shows what the skies actually 
looked like in 1930. The smudges of dirty sky near the smokestacks contradict the 
hopeful picture painted by Roy Johnson of the city’s Smoke Abatement League. In 
fact, some of the most prominent citizens of Indianapolis banded together that same 
year to form a special committee of the Smoke Abatement League aimed at raising 
money to fund an intensive study of the city’s smoke problems. The civic scions who 
lent their names to this cause included the governor, Harry G. Leslie; the mayor, 
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Reginald H. Sullivan; U.S. Senator Arthur R. Robinson, and U.S. Representative 
Louis Ludlow.314 
 
Figure 13. “White River Looking East Toward Downtown Indianapolis, 1930,” 
PO130_P_Box15_Folder4_217965-F. Bass Photo. Co. Collection, Indiana Historical Society. 
 
The people who worked on the fundraising project may have felt optimistic 
about the future of the city’s air quality, but in fact nothing would change. In 
December of 1937, the Smoke Abatement League would find itself at odds with the 
members of the council over the terms of the latest smoke ordinance while a thick 
blanket of fog (during the daytime) and smog (during the evening) covered the city, 
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endangering traffic and causing flight cancellations.315 In January of 1938 alone, 
nearly 1,100 tons of soot fell on the city.316  
Of course, air pollution does not stay neatly confined to discrete 
neighborhoods—zoning ordinances and planning codes cannot bind the wind. But by 
tracing the history of Indianapolis’s battle for decent air quality, it is possible to see 
nearly the same pattern that emerged from the city’s evolution with respect to 
sewerage, garbage collection and disposal, traffic management, and wastewater 
disposal. That pattern includes the following themes: the city’s commercial leaders 
identify a problem, hold a conference or commission a study, and then issue 
recommendations. The city’s political powerbrokers then engage in partisan disputes 
and delay taking action while the populace suffers the consequences of the delay. The 
city’s council passes ordinances, aiming bureaucratic weapons at the problem, while 
not fully empowering the bureaucracy to make effective and meaningful change. In 
some cases, such as air pollution or traffic, the adverse health consequences of this 
approach have not been limited to one particular area of the city. In most other cases, 
the southwest side of Indianapolis has repeatedly been the one location that has borne 
the brunt of the missteps.  
In 1954, residents who lived and worked in the neighborhoods near the 
sewage treatment plant reported the appearance of black or muddy brown stains on 
the exteriors of their homes, as well as a “nauseating” odor that they blamed on the 
sanitation plant.317 Workers at the sewage processing plant acknowledged that they 
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might be the source of the problem, as the plant was undergoing major renovations. In 
fact, they had completely shut down the plant for several days in mid-September to 
connect new equipment, and diverted the flow of approximately 500 million gallons 
of raw sewage into White River.318  The sewage then remained in the river as if 
parked, due to lower than normal water levels and a lack of heavy rain. The problem 
of the stains and odor persisted for a period of a few weeks that year, raising health 
concerns among the residents of the southwest side. Officials from the State Board of 
Health and the city’s Air Pollution Control Bureau explained that the hydrogen 
sulfide emitted by the raw sewage attached itself to the lead in the paint of the 
neighbors’ homes. That chemical reaction—hastened by very humid weather—
caused the discoloration of even freshly painted homes, turning the paint yellow, 
brown, black, and purple. At least one worker at the nearby Bridgeport Brass 
Company reported that the fumes also turned the copper there blue. The health 
officials assured the public that the fumes themselves, while disagreeable, were not 
harmful. 319  
The president of the Board of Sanitary Commissioners, Clarence T. Drayer, 
refused to accept responsibility for the problem. Instead, he blamed the chemical 
emissions from neighboring industries and noted that the city of Speedway regularly 
dumped its raw sewage into Eagle Creek, which flowed into White River near the 
wastewater plant (see Appendix 1).320 Regardless of the etiology of those odors and 
gases, the residents of the southwest side still had to cope with the noxious 
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conditions. Thanks in large part to the lack of leadership from government officials 
with respect to zoning and planning, the southwest quadrant of the city today hosts a 
sewage treatment plant, the South Side Sanitary Landfill, and the city’s garbage 
incinerator, as well as several heavy industrial plants, including the Indianapolis 
Power and Light Harding Street station, the Lilly Industrial Center, Olin Brass, Reilly 
Industries, and Rolls-Royce/Allison—along with parks, schools, and many homes. 
The ZIP Code for part of that area (the blocks between 400 South and 2700 
South Belmont Avenue) is 46221. The sewage treatment plant is at 2700 South 
Belmont. The South Side Sanitary Landfill, also within that ZIP Code, covers over 
200 acres from its address at 2651 Kentucky Avenue. The landfill is an EPA 
Superfund site.321 The city’s incinerator, operated by Covanta Energy, is at 2320 
South Harding Street, again within the 46221 ZIP Code. Most importantly, that is also 
the ZIP Code for some neighborhoods just to the north and west of the sewage 
treatment plant and the incinerator on the city’s southwest side. According to the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency’s “Envirofacts” information for that 
ZIP Code in January of 2008, no fewer than fourteen facilities within that area 
produced and released air pollutants.322 Twelve facilities reported toxic releases, and 
fifty-eight reported hazardous waste activities.323 The 46260 ZIP Code, in contrast, 
includes the wealthy far north side of the city of Indianapolis. The EPA’s Envirofacts 
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data for that area for the same time frame noted that just one facility produced and 
released air pollutants; no facilities reported toxic releases; and sixteen reported 
hazardous waste activities.324 Despite the intentions of the zoning and city planning 
experts, then, people have persisted in living near their workplaces, and it may have 
been hurting their health.  
The increased prevalence of cancer and toxic materials on the southwest side 
of Indianapolis, as compared with the rest of the city, may be a legacy of the decision-
making process and policies of the men who led the city from 1890 to 1930. A 
piecemeal approach to sewerage that valued low cost above all other factors resulted 
in the overflow problem. That problem has primarily affected those who live 
downstream, especially to the southwest of the city center. The political 
gamesmanship that characterized the process of obtaining and financing a wastewater 
treatment plant caused years of unnecessary delay, environmental damage, and 
potential adverse health consequences to the same population because of the city’s 
topography. And the delay in passing a zoning and planning law, coupled with poor 
leadership at the local level, resulted in a “plan-less” southwest side, where schools 
and parks abut heavy industry. 
Since the days of ancient Rome, streets, curbs, and gutters have helped 
humans survive by keeping unhealthy and undesirable things at a distance; but since 
at least the 1890s, that survival has come with a cost. In the 1890s, progress cost 
urban residents the street; they lost a place to meet their neighbors, a means of 
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cohesion, a community. Since the late nineteenth century, poorly designed and 
inadequate sewerage systems have cost low-income urban residents their health. Over 
the span of one hundred years, streets became agents of social sanitation, keeping not 
just dangerous microbes and traffic at a distance, but unhealthy and undesirable 
people—poor people—as well. While municipal sanitary engineers may not have 
consciously set out to restrict access to safe and healthy places to people with 
sufficient incomes, that has arguably been the result of their labors.  
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Conclusion 
The infrastructure of the street in Indianapolis—what was above it and below 
it—operated as nothing less than a center for discourses of power. It separated people 
along the lines of class, mobility, and health. The paving revolution was a boon to the 
interests of engineering, transportation, and commerce, but a bane to pedestrians’ 
safety and to residents accustomed to using the street as their “front yards.” The 
improvement of the streets shifted power from the people who were on foot to the 
people who were in motor vehicles as those in power drew new boundaries that kept 
people out of the streets.  The city leaders enthusiastically regulated not only drivers’ 
behavior, but also that of pedestrians. That same set of improvements caused the area 
of the sidewalk and curb to be more susceptible to regulation: as paving the streets 
shrank the amount of available safe public gathering space, government officials 
limited the acceptable use of that space by enacting tight controls on people’s actions. 
They drew new social and legal boundaries, placing limits on who could do what on 
the sidewalks. When city officials decided to sanction dumping on Sellers Farm, they 
identified that neighborhood as not being beautiful, important, or powerful enough to 
be worth living in. While simple geography (rather than negligence) may have steered 
the city’s leaders in the direction of Sellers Farm, their actions condemned the 
neighbors of Sellers Farm to a legacy of lower property values, the possibility of 
shorter life spans, and increased toxicity. The residents of the southwest side are 
contending every day with the lived reality of those decisions.  
City officials tried to employ zoning and organized city planning in an attempt 
to separate heavy industry from residential areas, but could do nothing to move 
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people who insisted on living close to where they worked. Ironically, just as the 
residents of Indianapolis most needed clear legal boundaries to protect them from 
heavy industries and toxic discharges, their leaders proved to be ineffective at solving 
the problems a late entry into zoning had engendered. Empty land was becoming 
scarce within the city, and planners tried to dictate to residents exactly how much 
space they were entitled to depending on their socioeconomic status. And when the 
city needed a sewerage system, city leaders built the least expensive, most polluting 
configuration possible. Aware for years of a serious environmental and sanitary 
problem with respect to raw sewage flowing into waterways, the city’s leaders 
nevertheless could not solve the problem of wastewater in a timely or efficient 
fashion. When they finally did obtain the necessary enabling legislation from the 
state, city officials ignored its generous provisions on both the number and placement 
of treatment plants. Instead, they located the plant in the same neighborhood as the 
garbage reduction facility and the dump.  
Whatever the leaders’ intentions, all of these actions effectively drew 
boundaries around the southwest side. These boundaries are not marked by street 
signs or other obvious identifiers, but they surely exist. They exist in the residents’ 
higher mortality rates from diseases like cancer. They exist in the discoloration of 
their homes and in the odor of their neighborhoods. The development of 
infrastructure occurring between 1890 and 1930—especially that related to sanitation 
and sewerage—worked to ensure that some parts of the city would actually be 
healthier than others for decades to come.  
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 In the city of Indianapolis since 1890, infrastructure has separated people from 
nature and from each other on two levels: its operational level, wherein it was an 
objective entity that performed according to its design, and its subjective level, where 
it operated as a social and hygienic barrier. Streets, curbs, sewers, and sidewalks are 
useful and necessary elements of public health and safety. We both want and need 
these elements to ensure our separation from things that are dangerous, such as 
speeding cars and contaminated water. When government officials exercise power to 
declare what parts of the city street are accessible to whom, or which neighborhoods 
will have a wastewater treatment plant, a landfill, or heavy industry nearby, 
infrastructure can work to separate people.  
In all these ways, those with the most power in Indianapolis politicized 
infrastructure—they manipulated it to serve their interests, usually at the expense of 
the poorest, least popular, and most powerless citizens. Drawing the boundaries of 
legality, social discourse, and health was a political act in each case, because it 
involved the exercise of power. Humans have infused the street and its related 
infrastructure with meaning since at least the 1890s. Streets, sidewalks, and curbs 
mark appropriate space for people—that which is healthy, safe, public, or “legal.” 
When infrastructure separates people in political ways, when it facilitates unequal 
conditions, the streets become barriers. It is the historian’s responsibility to ask about 
those barriers: Who put them there, and why? 
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Afterword 
When a community desires to be inclusive, its built environment can reflect 
that intention. When a community desires to exclude, its built environment can reflect 
that attitude, as well—witness the growth of “gated communities.” But what if the 
built environment is becoming ambiguous? People infuse streets, sidewalks, and 
curbs with meaning: curbs are reliable markers of territory, and even of what is legal 
and what is illegal. Crossing a curb could sometimes mean an arrest for trespassing. 
Physical features of the environment like curbs are no longer accurate indicators of 
legitimacy. In some cases, the boundaries between public and private property are 
now invisible. What does it mean if a curb no longer marks a traditional boundary? It 
means that a person is not safe from arrest or assault even if he respects the curb’s 
time-honored meaning. It means that there is less public space available for people to 
express themselves. It means that sidewalks as safe public spaces are disappearing as 
authorities arbitrarily redraw the lines of acceptable public behavior. This is important 
because as Farrar suggests, both discursive spaces and built spaces help us to orient 
and to claim identities for ourselves. One could further argue that sometimes, as in the 
case of Indianapolis and other cities with respect to infrastructure, built spaces are 
discursive spaces. When people experience a dissonance between their individual 
understandings of the boundaries and margins of urban spaces and the authorities’ 
interpretation of those spaces, they will be less likely to try to negotiate those spaces. 
They will become alienated and isolated, feeling unsure and unwelcome in their own 
city centers. 
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 A recent case illustrates just how hotly contested and politicized the territory 
surrounding the street has become. Far from being public space, it has morphed into a 
kind of quasi-public space. In other words, infrastructure has become totally 
dependent on the context for its character as a boundary. On 13 May 2003, President 
George W. Bush visited Indianapolis. Protesters lined the streets along his motorcade 
route, holding up signs as the procession passed. One activist, Carl Rising-Moore, 
“jogged alongside the street, waving … [a United Nations flag] from side to side.”325 
An Indianapolis Police Department officer yelled at Rising-Moore to back away from 
the motorcade, and when he continued to wave the flag, the officer chased him and, 
depending on the witness, either grabbed Rising-Moore or tackled him. Rising-Moore 
was trained in nonviolent protest tactics. Nevertheless, the officer accused Rising-
Moore of punching him during the confrontation. The Marion County Prosecutor 
charged Rising-Moore (who denied all of the allegations) with “battery with injury” 
and resisting law enforcement; a jury acquitted him of both charges after deliberating 
for about forty minutes.326 Apparently, Rising-Moore attracted the attention of law 
enforcement because he waved a flag too close to the street. He was in a public space, 
exercising his First Amendment rights in a peaceful fashion. His offense—what made 
the authorities notice him—was that he waved a flag. Regardless of his intentions, his 
act was interpreted as subversive. He was unaware that the curb was not the boundary 
line between acceptable and illegal public space. He did not know that the real 
boundary line was invisible and arbitrary, because the real boundary line was 
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subjective—it was the officer’s comfort level. It was as if the curb eroded; its 
function as a separator disappeared. 
 In Rising-Moore’s case, the authorities dictated what behavior was 
permissible on public property. His is not the only such instance. According to 
Margaret Kohn, it is now commonplace for cities (and universities) to regulate 
protests. In the wake of the World Trade Organization(WTO) protests in Seattle in 
1999, Quebec City built a fence to keep protesters away from its downtown when it 
hosted the Summit of the Americas in 2001.327 While “[t]he constitutionality of 
security perimeters remains unresolved,” restrictions in other open spaces are 
commonplace. 328  For example, universities now employ “free speech zones.” Buffer 
zones that exclude protesters around medical facilities where abortions are performed 
are routine, necessary, and legal. 329 The rules governing the acceptable use of 
“public” spaces change when authorities perceive a need for greater social control. 
Members of the public are subject to control in new places as those in power re-draw 
the boundary lines between space that is public and space that is off-limits, according 
to the exigencies of each unique situation. The meaning of infrastructure as a 
boundary marker is no longer clear. A sidewalk may not be public space any more. 
So, rather than describing legal characteristics of space, the very labels “public” and 
“private” can actually connote power relationships in space.330 
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A curb is no longer a reliable boundary marker. When people like rioters or 
drug runners routinely cross the line separating the sidewalk from the street, the 
authorities can label them as criminals. But the authorities themselves have begun to 
use technology to cross those same traditional legal and social boundaries. Consider 
“sonic lasers” as evidence of the seismic shift that traditional boundary lines of 
infrastructure, like the street and the sidewalk, have undergone in the present century. 
These devices are currently used by the United States and Israeli military forces, but 
they also have domestic law enforcement applications for crowd control.331 The two 
primary U.S. manufacturers of these non-lethal sonic weapons are based in 
California: HPV Technologies LLC in Costa Mesa, and American Technology 
Corporation (ATC) in San Diego. HPV Technologies’ property is called “MAD,” for 
Magnetic Audio Devices. According to their news release of 1 September 2005, on 
that date:  
HPV successfully projected audible sound over one mile. 
During a presentation requested by the L.A. Sheriff’s  
Department, a crowd . . . witnessed what we believe is 
the loudest, longest distance that audible, high fidelity  
sound has ever projected in the history of sound. The  
demonstration was conducted beside a desert runway  
at Edwards Air Force Base, California where MAD  
(Magnetic Audio Devices) equipment could be heard  
projecting clear, audible sounds of Frank Sinatra singing 
 .  . .  and Muhammad Ali reading poetry at a distance of 
more than 5,280 feet . . . ‘You don’t realize how powerful 
this stuff is until you stand a mile away, can’t see the  
transmitter, but can hear every word in a Queen song!’ 
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remarked Cmdr. Sid Heal, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Department.332 
 
ATC markets the LRAD (Long Range Acoustical Device), the MRAD (Medium 
Range Acoustical Device), and the martially named SoundSaber. The LRAD offers 
authorities “long-range notification and warning . . . designed to hail, notify and warn 
with superior intelligibility in excess of 500 yards.”333 The MRAD is designed to 
provide  “support [for] public service organizations (police, fire, etc.) for 
communication needs at shorter ranges to ensure safe and effective crowd control, 
building communication and special operation challenges.”334 For example, 
authorities could use the MRAD in a building to notify occupants of a tornado 
warning or fire alarm and to clearly deliver evacuation instructions. Finally, the 
SoundSaber offers “sound for outdoor applications, emergency and mass notification 
at long ranges, and difficult indoor spaces.”335  
The ATC euphemistically markets its sonic devices as “unique Directional 
Acoustic communication solutions” for the following government and force 
protection system applications: “combating the war on terrorism; enforcing perimeter 
and exclusion areas; determining intent; enhancing [a] non-lethal weapons suite; 
supporting military operations other than war; controlling crowds and maintaining 
compliance; disaster control; mass notification; emergency evacuation; [and], critical 
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infrastructure protection.”336  Several of those listed applications clearly involve 
social control. In fact, ATC supplied military police forces with the LRAD 500 sonic 
device for crowd control purposes in New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina.337 The New York Police Department uses the LRAD, and brought one out 
during protests at the 2004 Republican National Convention.338 The Boston Police 
Department also purchased the device from ATC, “citing its safety advantage over 
conventional crowd-control agents . . .”339 Even though HPV and ATC emphasize the 
communications applications of their products, at least one government has used the 
devices “as a less pleasant way to disperse crowds . . . Products from both companies 
could be used, at high volume, to harm subjects who do not comply with 
commands.”340  
In effect, thanks to these devices, a person could be protesting within her 
constitutional rights at a distance of one mile from a designated perimeter, and yet 
still be subject to this sort of “compliance maintenance” technology. This means that 
the street/curb/sidewalk is no longer patently public. Instead, this new technology 
creates a new type of space—not totally public, but not completely private, either. 
                                                
336 American Technology Corporation, “Government Solutions,” American Technology Corporation, 
http://www.atcsd.com/gov_sol.html (accessed 1 February 2006). 
337 Xeni Jardin, “Xeni on NPR, CNN: Sonic Weapons in Iraq—and now, US cities,” 
http://www.boingboing.net/2005/09/21/xeni_on_npr_cnn_soni.html (accessed 9 March 2006). 
338 Xeni Jardin, “Sonic ‘Lasers’ Head to Flood Zone,” Wired News, 
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/1,68732-0.html (accessed 9 March 2006). 
339 Ibid. 
340 Ibid.  According to Jardin, “[v]ehicle-mounted devices were used by Israeli authorities to scatter 
groups . . . when Palestinians and Jewish supporters gathered to protest Israel’s West Bank separation 
barrier. Dubbed ‘The Scream’ by the Israeli Army, the device sends out streams of noise in intervals of 
about 10 seconds. The specific sonic frequencies chosen affect the inner ear, creating dizziness and 
nausea in human targets. An Associated Press photographer present during the attack said that even 
after he covered his ears, he continued to hear sound ringing inside his head. In a report, AP quoted an 
unnamed Israeli military official as saying the device emits a frequency that targets the inner ear, can 
cause damage with exposure for several minutes at close range, and compels humans nearby to leave 
the area. Exposure for minutes at close range could cause hearing damage. Information about longer-
term exposure effects at long distances has not been publicly disclosed.” Ibid. 
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This new “quasi-public” area is space that is in play, contested, and subject to the 
wishes and needs of the authorities. Further, this hybrid space is now capable of 
extending a mile. Sonic devices can cross a mile’s worth of physical boundaries to 
enforce other boundaries—abstract boundaries of privilege, power, access, safety, and 
protection. Authorities can repel anyone who is non-compliant—and of course it is 
the authorities who will define noncompliance. 
Sonic devices are not just for crises, though—they can also serve as a kind of 
invisible fence. For the past few years, businesses from malls to convenience stores in 
the United Kingdom have been using an instrument called the “Mosquito” to repel 
unwanted youths from hanging out at their establishments. Compound Security 
Systems, the owner of the device, calls the Mosquito an “ultrasonic teenage deterrent” 
in its marketing literature. The Mosquito emits an irritating tone at an ultrasonic 
frequency that is audible only to teenagers; it is usually effective at clearing an area of 
teens within eight to ten minutes.341 This item would not exist unless it had a market 
ready to purchase it. That market consists of business owners who have deemed teens 
so threatening—and law enforcement so useless—that they have resorted to 
employing sonic devices to establish control over their retail spaces. This enables 
them to, in effect, select their customers according to age. 
The Mosquito is now available in the United States and Canada, and is 
marketed by a company called “Kids Be Gone.”342 Technology like the Mosquito 
proves that one no longer needs to be affiliated with the government to exert power 
over space; now, all that is necessary for “sanitizing” one’s perimeter by removing 
                                                
341 Compound Security Systems, “Our Products,” “Mosquito,” Compound Security Systems, 
http://www.compoundsecurity.co.uk/teenage_control_products.html (accessed 6 April 2008). 
342 Kids Be Gone, “Mosquito,” Kids Be Gone, http://www.kidsbegone.com (accessed 6 April 2008). 
 144 
undesirable youths is enough money to buy the right technology. And one no longer 
needs to be panhandling, poor, or protesting to be subject to regulation in public 
spaces; now, a person can be repelled by sonic means based on the mere fact of his 
age.  
Devices like the Mosquito and its military cousins (the MAD, LRAD, MRAD, 
and SoundSaber) help to both establish and maintain the hybrid, quasi-public space in 
this brave new world. In a sense, this technology enables those with enough power—
whether they are politically powerful or economically powerful—to transcend the 
barriers and boundaries that infrastructure has traditionally represented. The ability to 
transcend infrastructure, which is the stuff that forms the very skeletons of cities, may 
be the ultimate benchmark of true power in this new century. One could argue that 
these transgressions are the logical and predictable—if extreme—outgrowths of the 
arrogance of the early engineers and planners. Their sense of entitlement and their 
exclusion of the people whose lives were affected by their decisions may have been 
harbingers of the current state of affairs, wherein those with enough power can 
obliterate traditional legal, social, and spatial boundaries. 
 When members of the Indianapolis Common Council decided what behavior 
was appropriate on the streets and sidewalks of Indianapolis in the 1910s and 1920s, 
they exercised their authority to regulate public space. They empowered police to 
determine who was allowed in these areas and for what purposes. However much 
they were at odds with the First Amendment, the four ordinances described in 
Chapter Four at least required face-to-face interaction between the police and the 
suspect for their enforcement. In contemporary times, the boundaries that sidewalks, 
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streets, and curbs represent have become increasingly arbitrary and abstract. This 
subjectivity of interpretation tends to benefit those who are able-bodied, mobile, who 
live in desirable sections of cities and suburbs, and who do not question authority.  
How we consciously or unconsciously interpret our environment, including 
infrastructure, is important. Fitzpatrick and La Gory have written that “it is the 
meanings we attribute to the situation that affect our responses to it, rather than the 
objective circumstances of the situation itself.” 343 Our culture is a socially learned 
system of symbols and their meanings, and it dictates our behavior in public and 
private spaces.344 Culture determines the value we assign social spaces like sidewalks, 
curbs, and streets. Curbs are just six inches of granite or concrete until humans 
animate them with our subjective interpretations, and put them to work as agents of 
control—or subversion. Then, curbs are both beneficial and divisive at the same time.  
Streets and their related infrastructure separate in the interest of health and 
safety, but never everyone’s health and safety. They have functioned historically to 
benefit the people with the most power. In the 1890s, engineers were able to 
manipulate different interest groups to obtain the one surface for streets that was 
cheap enough and smooth enough to facilitate high volumes of traffic: asphalt 
pavement. They built the streets and the curbs, and in the process separated inner city 
residents from each other. Sewers, as extensions of the street, have always benefited 
people who live in more expensive neighborhoods, “upstream.” The more affluent the 
area, the healthier its residents. The more healthy a person, the less likely she is to 
view a curb as a barrier to access. In fact, access to all areas of a city increases as a 
                                                
343 Fitzpatrick and La Gory, 30. 
344 Ibid. 
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person becomes more “desirable” in the eyes of the culture—one who has a home, is 
mobile, and has discretionary income. In the context of zoning, although the planners 
of the 1910s clearly saw themselves as working in the interests of urban residents, 
their sense of entitlement, their sense that they knew best, was obvious. They sought 
security, efficiency, and order.345 Finally, infrastructure benefits the law enforcement 
agencies, militaries, and businesses that have the best technology. That technology 
enables officials to stretch the boundaries of the street for up to a mile in the interest 
of public safety, a secure homeland, or profit.  
When people seek power, mobility, a political voice, a place to shop, or a 
place to spend the night in ways that violate unwritten rules and written laws, they are 
attempting to cross boundaries, or even barriers—physical, visible, tangible barriers 
that separate people and erode communities. Infrastructure then becomes an agent of 
social sanitation. Streets no longer signify identity, control, or even separation: they 
signify power.  
 
 
                                                
345 Tehranian, 10.  
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